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Abstract
Based on a large and representative panel of German firms, this paper relates
a novel measure of subjective uncertainty to business expectations and firm deci-
sions. Uncertainty is measured by asking managers directly how uncertain they
are about their future business development. I show that the relationship between
perceived uncertainty and expectations is strongly negative at the micro level and
almost perfectly inverse in the aggregate. It is also state-dependent: uncertainty
co-moves less with expectations in bad times. In a case study at the onset of the
COVID-19 recession, I exploit the between-firm variation in firms’ uncertainty and
expectations to examine the implications of the “real options” theory. I find that
changes in uncertainty during the aggregate downturn do not predict “wait and see”
behavior. By contrast, first moment changes are related to investments deferral and
a reduction of the workforce.
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1 Introduction
An active literature is interested in understanding how uncertainty affects individual eco-
nomic decisions, and as a result, business cycle fluctuations. Similar to expectations,
uncertainty is inherently subjective. Thus, a good starting point to analyze how uncer-
tainty affects outcomes are the beliefs of decision makers in firms and households. To
guide their actions, individuals form expectations in the presence of uncertainty. Hence,
conceptually expectations and subjective uncertainty are closely related. Yet, due to a
lack of adequate measures, little is known about their empirical relationship and their
relative importance for economic decisions.
This paper presents a new measure of managers’ perceived uncertainty and relates it
to their expectations and corporate decisions. In particular, I use the results from a novel
survey question that asks firms directly how uncertain they are about the development of
their business. This question is part of the ifo Business Survey, a representative German
business survey that covers roughly 9,000 firms each month. Both at the micro level and
in the time series, it allows me to develop stylized facts about the relationship between
managers’ subjective uncertainty vis-à-vis their business expectations over the next six
months and their assessment of their current business situation. All three variables are
reported on visual analogue scales, which are essentially more differentiated versions of
Likert scales. To establish my baseline results, I focus on the manufacturing sector from
2017 to 2019: during this time, it slipped from a boom to a moderate recession. To verify
my findings, I extend the analysis to other sectors and to fluctuations of the economy
during the subsequent COVID-19 crisis. Exploiting firm heterogeneity and the large
aggregate variation in the onset of this crisis, I relate uncertainty and expectations to
firms’ investment and employment decisions.
My main findings are fourfold. First, asking managers directly about their uncertainty
seems to be a sensible method to elicit beliefs. Second, firms’ perceived uncertainty about
their future business development is strongly negatively related to their business expecta-
tions. This stylized fact is manifest both at the micro level and in the time series. Third,
I find that this relationship is weaker in bad times. Managers perceive high uncertainty
in a period of low economic activity even if expectations improve. Fourth, in contrast to
first moment changes, changes in uncertainty neither predict the postponement of invest-
ment projects nor a “freeze” of the number of employees in the onset of the COVID-19
crisis. This is not in line with the theoretical mechanism of “wait and see” behavior.
Regarding the measurement of subjective business uncertainty, my first result is that
managers have a good understanding of the term “uncertainty”—in the sense of “difficult
to predict”. This is based on a comparison of the answers to two questions: one that
asks respondents directly how uncertain they are about their business development and
a second one that asks them for an assessment of the difficulty to predict this develop-
ment. I document that the responses to the two questions essentially contain the same
information. Conceptually, both questions are holistic and able to capture not only risk,
but also Knightian uncertainty.1 In case of risk, the second question is a measure of
variance. In sum, this suggests that a direct question can be a sensible tool to measure
firms’ subjective uncertainty.
1The categorization of uncertainty in risk and Knightian uncertainty (or “ambiguity”) dates back
to Knight (1921). In today’s understanding, risk refers to a situation in which individuals can assign
probabilities to a set of future events, while this is not possible in the case of Knightian uncertainty.
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Using firm-level data from the manufacturing sector, my second result is that perceived
uncertainty is strongly negatively related to business expectations and respondents’ as-
sessment of the current business situation. Based on bivariate relationships, the more
pessimistic a respondent or the worse her assessment of the business situation, the more
uncertain she is. This holds true both for the pooled sample and within firms. How-
ever, the relationships are not linear. The negative relationship is stronger when firms
are pessimistic compared to when they are optimistic. These findings recall the inverse
relationship of expected returns and volatility observed in equity markets (see, for in-
stance, Bekaert and Wu 2000). Managers’ expectations and subjective uncertainty seem
to behave similarly to these financial market outcomes.
Next, I study how perceived uncertainty is related to combinations of the assessment
of the business situation and expectations. Two cases are of particular interest: a good
business situation combined with unfavorable expectations, and a bad business situation
combined with favorable expectations. From an aggregate view, many such instances
might correspond to business cycle turning points. Based on the micro data, I find that
uncertainty is high in both cases. Overall, it emerges as a stylized fact that managers are
highly uncertain if either the situation is assessed as poor or expectations are unfavorable,
or both. Since in a bad situation uncertainty is always high, the relationship between
uncertainty and expectations is weaker in bad times. These findings suggest that man-
agers’ uncertainty increases when expectations deteriorate, it stays high in a bad business
situation, and it only decreases when the business situation normalizes. Further below, I
provide a tentative intuition for this pattern based on the negatively skewed distribution
of firms’ growth rates.
The stylized facts from the micro level carry over to the time series for the manufac-
turing sector. The central and novel result is that perceived uncertainty and expectations
are almost perfectly inversely correlated in the aggregate. The same is true for the rela-
tionship between uncertainty and the business situation. This confirms the stylized fact
from proxy measures which indicate that uncertainty is counter-cyclical. Moreover, in
line with the micro evidence, the relationship between uncertainty and expectations ap-
pears to be state-dependent: uncertainty correlates less with expectations if the average
business situation in unfavorable.
I demonstrate the validity of these time series results along several dimensions. First,
the inverse relation between uncertainty and expectations holds for all major sectors—
namely manufacturing, construction, retail and wholesale trade, and services—and the
German economy as a whole. Moreover, it becomes especially apparent during the
COVID-19 crisis in the first half of 2020. By mid-2020, expectations improve, but un-
certainty persists, as the economy stays weak. These stylized facts hold true for three
different measures of subjective uncertainty. Data from the Survey of Business Uncer-
tainty administered by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta displays a similar pattern
for the US.
The simultaneity of aggregate movements in subjective uncertainty and expectations
challenges traditional recursive identification schemes in vector-autoregressive frameworks
that attempt to causally link uncertainty to outcomes. Due to possible endogeneity of
uncertainty and growth, Ludvigson et al. (2020) also view other identification strategies
used in time-series econometrics as problematic. This applies in particular to recessions,
when uncertainty fluctuates the most. Using micro data offers an alternative way to
learn about the effect of uncertainty on outcomes. It has two advantages. First, besides
time-series variation, also differences in the cross section can be exploited. Second, it
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provides the opportunity to directly test theoretical channels that connect uncertainty
to outcomes: most mechanisms rely on the behavior of individuals. This motivates me
to use firm-level data to study the role of subjective uncertainty and expectations for
corporate decisions.
In particular, I conduct a case study focusing on the onset of the COVID-19 crisis.
The aim is to empirically examine the theoretical “real options” channel. Its idea is that
high uncertainty can make it rational for firms to delay (partially) irreversible investments
and to “freeze” hiring. Decision makers “wait and see” until more information is available
(Bernanke, 1983; Brennan and Schwartz, 1985; McDonald and Siegel, 1986). In the case of
an aggregate downturn, uncertainty increases. At the same time, managers’ expectations
deteriorate, which may let them defer investments and reduce employment. To better
understand the importance of uncertainty and expectations for firm behavior, I exploit
the between-firm variation of these perceptions during the COVID-19 shock. I find that
firms’ decisions to postpone investment projects and to reduce the number of employees
are related to first moment changes, but not to changes in uncertainty. While “wait and
see” may describe some firms’ behavior, the results from averaging over all firms are not
in line with the predictions from the “real options” channel.
This paper contributes to several strands of the empirical literature about uncertainty,
firms, and business cycles. First, it is part of the literature concerned with the measure-
ment and analysis of subjective business uncertainty. Over the last decade, a handful of
surveys have started to elicit the subjective uncertainty of businesses with respect to their
own future development. For the US, Altig et al. (2020b) have developed the monthly
Survey of Business Uncertainty for quantitative one-year ahead expectations and uncer-
tainty regarding a firm’s growth of sales, investment, and employment.2 Respondents are
asked for five scenarios from best to worst of the outcome variable. Subsequently, the
survey elicits probabilities for these scenarios. Uncertainty is then calculated as a mea-
sure of variance of these probability distributions.3 Bachmann et al. (2018) present an
alternative approach for a quarterly supplement to the ifo Business Survey for Germany.
They measure subjective uncertainty as the difference between sales growth expectations
in the best and in the worst case. Both Altig et al. (2020b) and Bachmann et al. (2018)
relate uncertainty to past growth and forecast errors at the micro level. I extend this
growing strand of literature in three ways. First, I present a new direct and holistic
measure of managers’ perceived uncertainty. Second, I focus on the relationship between
uncertainty and expectations. Third, by considering the business situation, I add a new
dimension to the analysis: the relative level position of a firm in its cycle.
Due to the absence of survey-based measures of subjective uncertainty, almost all
time-series studies in the literature on uncertainty shocks rely on proxy measures.4 For a
recent comprehensive overview, see Cascaldi-Garcia et al. (2020). A common finding from
2The resulting time series are available online at https://www.frbatlanta.org/research/surveys/business-
uncertainty.
3Similarly, Bloom et al. (2017) describe quantitative questions on sales growth uncertainty in the
Management and Organizational Practices Survey administered by the Census in 2015. For the UK, the
Decision Maker Panel also includes questions that follow this methodology (Bloom et al., 2018a).
4Popular approaches include indices of implied or realized volatility of stock market returns (Bloom,
2009; Barrero et al., 2017), the cross-sectional dispersion of firm-level outcomes, expectations, or forecast
errors (Bachmann and Bayer, 2013, 2014; Bloom et al., 2018b; Bachmann et al., 2013), the conditional
volatility of statistical forecast errors from macro time series (Jurado et al., 2015), counts of uncertainty-
related keywords in news publications (Baker et al., 2016), and time devoted to uncertainty-related topics
in quarterly earnings conference calls (Hassan et al., 2019).
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these time-series measures is that they are counter-cyclical. This paper differs from the
literature on proxy measures by presenting aggregate time series of managers’ subjective
uncertainty about their firms’ business development—jointly with their expectations and
an assessment of their business situation.5
This paper also contributes to the survey-based micro-econometric literature that
links the subjective uncertainty of economic decision makers to outcomes. Due to the
scarcity of data on subjective uncertainty, the literature for households is small. In a
recent contribution, Ben-David et al. (2018) relate households’ expectations and sub-
jective uncertainty about their personal income to economic decisions. They find that
individuals with more uncertain expectations exhibit more precaution in their consump-
tion and investment behavior.6 The first contribution concerning firms stems from Guiso
and Parigi (1999) who measure the uncertainty of managers about future sales growth.
Based on a cross section of Italian firms, they find that businesses with similar expecta-
tions about sales growth, but higher uncertainty, invest less.7 In the same spirit, Dibiasi
et al. (2018) study the investment response of a small share of firms that were exposed to
an uncertainty-inducing referendum in Switzerland. Their result is that uncertain firms
with a high degree of irreversibility lower investment. My analysis during the COVID-19
shock differs from previous work due to the focus on corporate decisions on investment
and employment and since I exploit the variation of uncertainty in an aggregate downturn.
Furthermore, this paper is part of the growing literature on uncertainty and expecta-
tions during the COVID-19 crisis. For the US and the UK, Altig et al. (2020a) and Baker
et al. (2020) document large increases in both proxy measures of uncertainty and subjec-
tive business uncertainty. Using proxy measures, Baker et al. (2020) estimate that half
of the aggregate drop in output can be related to second moment effects. Based on data
of the ifo Business Survey, Buchheim et al. (2020a) study corporate mitigation strategies
in the face of the COVID-19 shock. They highlight the relation of firms’ actions with
pre-existing business conditions and with expectations about the duration of the crisis.
My analysis differs in that I focus on individual changes of uncertainty and expectations
that constitute the aggregate variation in the onset of the COVID-19 recession.
My case study that examines firms’ “wait and see” behavior is also reminiscent of the
literature that studies the impact of uncertainty shocks on the aggregate economy using
real business cycle models. As a prominent example, Bloom et al. (2018b) generate drops
of 2.5% of GDP with a model that uses nonconvex adjustment costs and the variance
of productivity shocks as a measure of risk. Bachmann and Bayer (2013) specifically
study the impact of uncertainty on business cycle fluctuations through the “real options”
channel. In line with the results from my case study at the onset of the COVID-19 crisis,
they find rather small effects.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the data and the survey ques-
tions. Section 3 compares two measures of perceived uncertainty. Section 4 analyzes the
relationship between subjective uncertainty, business expectations, and managers’ assess-
ment of the business situation at the micro level. Section 5 presents time series of these
5To the best of my knowledge, to date there exists only one study that conducts econometric analyses
with an aggregate time series of firms’ subjective uncertainty. It is based on an Austrian business survey
(Glocker and Hölzl, 2019).
6Other household studies that relate measures of subjective uncertainty to outcomes include Guiso
et al. 1992, Guiso et al. 2002, and Leduc and Liu 2016.
7Bontempi et al. 2010 examine the same relationship for a panel of Italian firms from 1996 to 2004
and show that the relationship between uncertainty and investment varies over time and can become
insignificant, which they attribute to changes in the competitive landscape.
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variables for the manufacturing sector. Section 6 shows additional time series evidence
that also covers the COVID-19 crisis. Moreover, it presents a micro-level case study at
the onset of this crisis that relates uncertainty and expectations to corporate decisions
about investment and employment.
2 Data
This paper is based on data from the monthly ifo Business Survey that currently cov-
ers roughly 9,000 German firms. The survey is conducted by the ifo Institute. Data
in processible form is available since the German unification in 1990 (since 1980 for
West Germany). The sample of firms is maintained to be representative of the German
economy. To deal with attrition, ifo adds new respondents to the survey (see Sauer and
Wohlrabe 2020). The survey covers firms in manufacturing (IBS-IND, 2020), construction
(IBS-CON, 2020), retail and wholesale trade (IBS-TRA, 2020), and services (IBS-SERV,
2020). Its data on the firms’ assessment of their business situation and business expecta-
tions form the basis of the ifo Business Climate Index, a leading indicator of the German
business cycle. As a widely respected measure of business sentiment, it attracts consid-
erable attention from the general public, practitioners, and policy makers. Moreover, ifo
Institute is responsible for collecting data according to a set of EU-harmonized business
survey questions. They feed into the EU-wide business sentiment index composed by the
European Commission.8
A business participating in the survey can be a stand-alone firm or a division of a large
conglomerate. The position of the personnel within the firms who fill out the questionnaire
is high: Sauer and Wohlrabe (2019) find that more than 90% of the respondents are top-
level managers, such as CEOs, CFOs, or department heads. Furthermore, the results
from a meta survey from fall 2019 suggest that the respondents within a firm rarely
change. Altogether, this ensures very high quality data.
2.1 Two Samples for the Micro Analysis
Besides the presentation of aggregate time series, I draw on two main samples of micro
data for this paper. The first sample uses data from the manufacturing sector. It starts
with the introduction of the direct question for firms’ subjective uncertainty in the on-
line part of the survey in July 2017 and ranges until January 2020. In contrast to the
other major sectors, namely construction, wholesale and retail trade, and services, the
manufacturing sector went through half a business cycle in this period: from a boom in
2017 to a recession that started in the third quarter of 2018. This makes it particularly
interesting when studying fluctuations in uncertainty. The main analyses are based on
the subsample of manufacturing firms that responded to the online part of the survey,
as opposed to paper-based participation. In the sample period, roughly three quarters of
all survey participants responded online. This is equivalent to about 1.500 manufactur-
8Aggregate survey results for Germany are presented at www.ifo.de/w/3fvxPxj2P, the harmo-
nized European results, including the European Economic Sentiment Indicator, can be found here:
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/indicators-statistics/economic-databases/business-
and-consumer-surveys_en.
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ing firms each month.9 The manufacturing sample ends in January 2020 to exclude the
COVID-19 crisis. I study it in a separate section of this paper.
The second sample is comprised of data from manufacturing, construction, retail and
wholesale trade, and services.10 I use it for a case study at the onset of the COVID-19
crisis. The survey waves of interest range from January to April 2020. The baseline anal-
ysis only takes onto account the observations from online participants, but a robustness
test also includes other respondents.
2.2 Survey Questions
The basis for this paper is a novel direct survey question on subjective business uncer-
tainty. I compare the responses of this question to the answers of a second new question
on subjective uncertainty. Moreover, I relate them to business expectations and an as-
sessment of the business situation. This section explains the survey methodology and the
exact wordings of the relevant questions.
In 2005, ifo introduced a new question design to capture firms’ assessment of their
current business situation and their expectations for the business development in the
subsequent six months. Respondents of the online questionnaires provide their answer
by clicking on a visual analogue scale with underlying values that range from 0 to 100.11
In 2017, ifo started to elicit subjective uncertainty using the same technology. Visual
analogue scales are essentially continuous versions of the well-known Likert scales. As
such, they are qualitative in nature, and are used, for instance, in medical research
to assess feelings and pain intensity (Jensen et al., 2003). Visual analogue scales are
easy to understand and, in contrast to trichotomous questions, allow for a differentiated
assessment of a respondent’s beliefs.
Appendix A shows a screenshot of the original questions regarding the perceived
business situation, expectations, and uncertainty from ifo’s online questionnaire in the
manufacturing survey. Translated into English, the questions are as follows:
1. We assess our current state of business as
Respondents can click a the visual analogue scale that is labeled “bad” and “good”
at its ends, respectively, and “satisfactory” at the center.
2. In the next 6 months, our state of business is likely to
Respondents can click on a visual analogue scale that is labeled “become rather
more unfavorable” and “become rather more favorable” at its ends, respectively, and
“roughly stay the same” at the center.
9Appendix A shows that there are almost no differences between the answers of online participants
compared to those who participated paper-based. There is only one notable difference: online participants
are more frequently representing large firms (250 or more employees), and somewhat less frequently small
firms (less than 50 employees). However, there is no significant difference in the variables capturing the
respondents’ the assessment of the current business situation and business expectations, which form the
core of the analysis in the subsequent sections.
10I follow the data cleaning and harmonization procedure described in Link (2020). This involves
the assignment of industry codes of the WZ08 classification to all observations and in some cases the
aggregation of responses of subsidiaries to the entity level of firms. The GermanWZ08 classification, short
for “Klassifikation der Wirtschaftszweige 2008” is closely related to the European industry classification
system NACE Rev. 2.
11See Stangl (2009) for details on the design and a comparison to the traditional trichotomous ques-
tions.
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3. We assess the uncertainty w.r.t. our business development in the next 6 months as:
Respondents can click on a visual analogue scale that is labeled “low” and “high” at
its ends, respectively, and “average / usual for the season” at the center.
In addition to eliciting firms’ perceived business situation and expectations using visual
analogue scales, ifo has continued to apply its more traditional trichotomous questions for
these variables. These traditional questions on the business situation and expectations,
in their English translation, read: 1) We assess our current state of business as (a)
good (b) satisfactory (c) bad, and 2) Our state of business is likely to (a) become more
favourable (b) stay more or less unchanged (c) become less favorable. Question 1) appears
in the section with headline “Current situation” and question 2) in the section with
headline “Expectations for the next 6 months”. I will occasionally use its responses in
the subsequent analyses when categorization is helpful.12
Following a proposal from the EU Commission’s unit for “Economic Situation, Fore-
casts, Business and Consumer Surveys”, ifo implemented a second question regarding
uncertainty in April 2019. This question is going to become part of the set of EU-
harmonized business survey questions in 2021. Hence, it is going to be available for all
countries in the EU. It is based on a similar question included in the business survey of
the Austrian Institute of Economic Research, which has been asked in different versions
since the 1980s (Glocker and Hölzl, 2019). The second question dealing with uncertainty
is part of the survey’s section titled “Expectations for the next 6 months”. It is asked
both online and using paper questionnaires. Translated into English, the question reads:
4. The future development of our business situation is currently
2 easy to predict
2 rather easy to predict
2 rather difficult to predict
2 difficult to predict
The responses to questions 3 and 4 yield two separate measures of subjective uncer-
tainty. Let unc denote the uncertainty measure based on the responses to question 3 and
diff_pred be the variable that captures the responses to question 4.
3 Comparing Two Measures of Subjective Uncertainty
When characterizing and comparing the two measures of uncertainty unc and diff_pred,
we note similarities and differences in the underlying questions. Conceptually, we can
compare three dimensions. First, any uncertainty measure is characterized by its “object”–
the variable over which an individual is uncertain. Second, since uncertainty is forward-
looking, the time horizon matters. Third, the way we ask for uncertainty can differ.
Both unc and diff_pred have essentially the same object and the same time horizon of
uncertainty: the “business development” and the “development of the business situation”
over the subsequent six months. The survey deliberately uses the holistic object of “busi-
ness development”. It can be understood as an umbrella term for all relevant firm-specific
12The responses to the visual analogue scale questions seem to measure essentially the same as the
trichotomous questions: the two unweighted aggregate monthly time series for situation and expectations
from 2005 to 2020, respectively, are highly correlated with correlation coefficients of 99% and 86%.
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variables that affect the future path of the business. A meta survey conducted in the
fall of 2019 sheds light on the variables that the respondents of the ifo Business Survey
consider most important for their assessment of the business situation and expectations.
The five factors most important to manufacturing firms are profits, turnover, demand, the
stock of orders, and costs (see Appendix B). To further investigate the factors feeding into
the holistic measures of business expectations and the business situation, in Appendix
B I relate both variables in separate regressions to other variables from the ifo Business
Survey. The main findings are that the highest share of the variation of the business
situation is explained by the assessments of the profit and order situation, respectively,
and by the capacity utilization at the time of the survey. Business expectations are most
closely related to production expectations according to the R-squared metric.
Hence, unc and diff_pred are comprehensive uncertainty measures. By capturing
a wide range of aspects in managers’ information set, they differ from measures that
focus on the uncertainty concerning the development of one particular firm variable,
such as sales or employment, as in the surveys presented by Altig et al. (2020b) and
Bachmann et al. (2018). Advantages of the comprehensive approach are its brevity and
universality. A wide range of sources of uncertainty is covered. Moreover, unc and
diff_pred capture both risk and Knightian uncertainty. However, this comes at the cost
of a lack of transparency regarding the exact source of the uncertainty.
The main difference between unc and diff_pred, in addition to the mode of delivery,
is the way they ask for uncertainty. Question 3 asks respondents directly how uncertain
they are, while question 4 asks indirectly by inquiring about the degree of difficulty that
respondents perceive in predicting the future business development. The responses to the
indirect question 4 may either reflect uncertainty as risk, that is, a second moment, or as
Knightian uncertainty. In the direct question, it is less clear a priori what respondents
think when they are asked for their “uncertainty”. Thus, by comparing unc and diff_pred,
I analyze the influence that the type of question has on the responses, and whether
managers in firms have a good understanding of the term “uncertainty”.
Appendix B presents summary statistics of the variables unc and diff_pred. Most
importantly, I find that unc covers the entire range of values between 0 and 100, and
that the answer category “rather difficult to predict” is the clear mode of diff_pred, while
only very few respondents choose the category “easy to predict”.13 Figure 1 presents the
mean values of the responses from the direct uncertainty question 3, unc, for each of the
categories of the indirect uncertainty question 4, diff_pred. The bar chart is based on the
subsample covering the period from April 2019 to January 2020 for which both variables
are available.
The main result is that the two variables are almost perfectly aligned: advancement by
one category in the perceived difficulty of predicting the future development of the firms’
business situation corresponds to a mean of unc that is roughly 20 points higher. In other
words, the more difficult respondents perceive the prediction of the future development
of their business situation, the more uncertain they report to be on the visual analogue
scale. Appendix B presents a box plot instead of the bar chart and demonstrates that
this finding is robust to using medians instead of means.
13One reason for few responses with the category “easy to predict” may be the stylized fact, based
on proxy measures, that uncertainty behaves counter-cyclically (Bloom, 2014). In the period for which
diff_pred is available, namely from April 2019 to January 2020, the manufacturing sector was in a
recession. Thus, uncertainty is likely to be above a longer-term average at this time.
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Figure 1: Comparison of two measures of subjective uncertainty
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Notes: The figure illustrates the mean values of subjective uncertainty (unc), the responses to the
direct uncertainty question 3 in Section 2.2, for each of the categorical answer options of the indirect
uncertainty question 4 (diff_pred) in Section 2.2 (blue bars). The orange whiskers denote ±1.96 standard
error bands for the mean values.
The fact that unc and diff_pred are very similar implies that respondents have a
good understanding of the term “uncertainty” when they are directly asked for it. Hence,
a direct question for managers’ uncertainty appears to be an easy and sensible way to
elicit firms’ subjective beliefs. The remainder of the paper focuses on the direct uncer-
tainty measure unc. It is available for a longer period of time than diff_pred, and it has
advantage of being a near-continuous variable. However, I replicate most results using
diff_pred for robustness.
4 Subjective Uncertainty at the Micro Level
Using survey data from businesses allows me to study the properties of uncertainty at
the micro level. Moreover, it enables me to study the relationship between perceived
uncertainty and expectations from the same respondent. In addition, I can relate subjec-
tive uncertainty to the self-assessed business situation of a firm. Given the stylized fact
that proxy measures of uncertainty are counter-cyclical, I expect a negative relationship
between uncertainty and the business situation. The panel dimension of the sample offers
ample variation in the cross section and the time series.
This section has three parts. I start by examining the bivariate relationships between
perceived uncertainty vis-à-vis expectations and the business situation, respectively. Sec-
ond, I study the uncertainty of respondents for combination of these variables. Third,
I relate uncertainty to other variables of business activity that are likely to feed into
managers’ assessment of the business situation and expectations.
4.1 Uncertainty vs. Expectations and the Business Situation
Figure 2 illustrates two relationships in the pooled sample of manufacturing firms: the
relationship between business uncertainty (unc) and business expectations in the left plot,
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and the relationship between business uncertainty (unc) and the firms’ assessment of their
business situation in the right plot. Based on roughly 46,000 firm-time observations, I
present non-parametric regression lines and linear fitted lines.
Figure 2: Relation of subjective uncertainty to expectations and the business situation
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Notes: This figure shows non-parametric kernel regression lines of degree zero with shaded 95% confi-
dence bands as well as fitted linear regression lines for the relationship between uncertainty (unc) and
business expectations in the left plot, and between uncertainty (unc) and the business situation in the
right plot. The non-parametric lines use an epanechnikov kernel and the “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth
(Silverman, 1986). The assessment of the business situation, expectations, and uncertainty are based on
questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 2.2. Responses are elicited using visual analogue scales that range from
0 to 100, respectively.
First, I observe a very strong negative and near-linear relationship between subjective
uncertainty and expectations. Hence, the more pessimistic respondents are about the
development of their business situation over the next six months, the more uncertain
they are about it. Moreover, subjective uncertainty is strongly negatively related to the
respondents’ assessment of the business situation, which indicates the position of a firm
in its cycle. Managers perceive higher uncertainty the worse they assess the state of
business of their firm. The raw correlations of both relationships in the pooled sample
are -0.34.
I formalize this descriptive evidence by means of regressions. In doing so, I add
significance levels and I further check for the asymmetries in high and low expectations
and in good and bad business situations. I also specifically examine the within-firm time
variation.14 This can lead to a better understanding of the time variation in aggregate
uncertainty, which is at the center of a large body of the literature on uncertainty and
business cycle fluctuations.
14I note that the visual analogue scale is identical for all firms and, hence, is designed to show time-
variation within businesses. However, due to the rather short period of time of the sample of less than
three years, some firms might be above or below their longer-run average expectations or their “normal”
business situation in most or all of the sample horizon.
10
Table 1: Relation of subjective uncertainty (unc) to expectations and the business situation
Dependent variable: uncertainty (unc) within-firm variation of uncertainty (unc)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business expectations -0.409∗∗∗
(0.0213)
Business situation -0.329∗∗∗
(0.0171)
Business expectations low -0.507∗∗∗
(0.0353)
Business expectations high -0.323∗∗∗
(0.0348)
Business situation low -0.387∗∗∗
(0.0342)
Business situation high -0.294∗∗∗
(0.0254)
Demeaned: business expectations -0.345∗∗∗
(0.0143)
Demeaned: business situation -0.367∗∗∗
(0.0128)
Demeaned: business expectations low -0.409∗∗∗
(0.0185)
Demeaned: business expectations high -0.273∗∗∗
(0.0177)
Demeaned: business situation low -0.401∗∗∗
(0.0157)
Demeaned: business situation high -0.324∗∗∗
(0.0156)
Constant 76.10∗∗∗ 73.63∗∗∗ 54.63∗∗∗ 56.48∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗ 0.00397 -0.545∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗
(1.103) (0.950) (0.338) (0.345) (0.00519) (0.00500) (0.0918) (0.0833)
No. of obs. 46394 46413 46394 46413 42802 42809 42802 42809
No. of firms 2598 2601 2598 2601 1766 1765 1766 1765
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.080 0.11 0.081 0.11
Notes: Results from OLS regressions with firm-month observations. The dependent variable in columns 1 to 4 is
subjective uncertainty, (unc); in columns 5 to 8 it is a variable capturing the within-firm time variation of unc. It is
constructed as the difference of unc from the firm-specific mean of unc. The regressors in columns 1 to 4 are based on
the responses from questions 1 and 2 in Section 2.2. The regressors in columns 5 to 8 are also based on these responses,
but capture their within-firm time variation for firms with at least 10 observations. Columns 3 and 4 show results from
piecewise regressions with a break at 50 for low and high values of expectations and situation on the visual analogue
scale. Columns 7 and 8 present results from piecewise regressions for the demeaned regressors with a break at the
firm-specific means, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01.
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Table 1 presents pooled ordinary least squares regressions of uncertainty (unc) on
expectations and the business situation. The negative estimates in columns 1 and 2 cor-
respond to the slopes of the linear predicted lines in figure 2. Both coefficients are highly
significant. If expectations are 10 points lower on the visual analogue scale, uncertainty is
4.1 points higher on average. For a 10 point lower situation, on average, the uncertainty
differential is 3.3 points. This captures both the variation between and within firms. The
R-squared values of 0.11 and 0.12 in columns 1 and 2, respectively, indicate the presence
of ample variation that is not captured by the bivariate relationships.
To detect asymmetries, I split the sample into high and low expectations, and into
high and low values of the assessment of the business situation. I define numbers on the
visual analogue scale of 50 or above as “high” and all others as “‘low”. In columns 3 and 4,
I then regress uncertainty (unc) on expectations and the business situation, respectively,
using piecewise linear models with a break at 50. Formally,
uncit = α0 + α
l
1x
l
i,t + α
h
1x
h
i,t + ǫit,
where xl
i,t = xi,tI(xi,t<50), x
h
i,t = xi,tI(xi,t ≥ 50), I(·) is the indicator function, and xi,t
denotes either expectations or the business situation of firm i at time t.
Column 3 demonstrates that the coefficients αl1 for low and α
h
1 for high expectations
are both negative and highly significant. Moreover, uncertainty appears to correlate more
strongly with low expectations than with high expectations. A Wald test clearly rejects
the null hypothesis at the 1%-significance level that the two coefficients are equal. Hence,
the relationship between uncertainty and expectations is asymmetric. More unfavorable
expectations generally go along with higher uncertainty, but more so for low expectations.
Column 4 shows that the coefficients of low and high business situations are both negative
and highly significant. While the coefficient of the subsample of bad situations is larger
in absolute terms, a Wald test cannot reject the null of equality at the 5%-level (p-
value is 0.055). I conclude that a simple linear model captures the relationship between
uncertainty and the business situation in the pooled sample with reasonable accuracy.
To isolate the within-firm variation in the panel, I subtract the firm-specific means
from the firm-time values of uncertainty, expectations, and the business situation. I do
so for a subsample of firms for which at least ten observations are available. More than
92% of the pooled sample remains. Columns 5 and 6 show OLS regressions with these
demeaned variables, which produce the same results as fixed effect regressions. Similar
to columns 1 and 2, columns 5 and 6 indicate negative and highly significant coefficients
for both expectations and the business situation. Magnitudes are also similar.
To examine asymmetries in the within-variation, I define values at or above a firms’
mean as “high” and all remaining values as “low”. Columns 7 and 8 present results from
piecewise linear regressions with the demeaned variables and a break at the firm-specific
mean of expectations and the business situation, respectively. Technically, I estimate
u˜ncit = α0 + α
l
1x˜
l
i,t + α
h
1 x˜
h
i,t + ǫit,
where x˜l
i,t = x˜i,tI(xi,t<x¯i), x˜
h
i,t = x˜i,tI(xi,t ≥ x¯i), I(·) is again the indicator function, x¯i
is the mean of expectations or the business situation of firm i, and x˜i,t = xi,t − x¯i denotes
the demeaned expectations or the business situation of firm i at time t. u˜ncit is the
analogously demeaned uncertainty variable.
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Column 7 again points to an asymmetry in the relationship between uncertainty
and expectation values that are above or below the firm mean. The difference in the
coefficients is significant at the 1%-level. For the average firm, an increase in expectations
by 10 points above its mean on the visual analogue scale goes along with a decrease in
uncertainty by 2.7 points. A decrease in expectations of the same magnitude below the
mean coincides with an increase of uncertainty by 4.1 points. Column 8 demonstrates the
difference between the coefficients of above average and below average business situations
is also statistically highly significant. However, the difference is somewhat smaller than
that in expectations.
Based on plots similar to Figure 2, Appendix C shows that the stylized facts con-
cerning the negative bivariate relationships between uncertainty and expectations, and
between uncertainty and the business situation, also hold for the indirect uncertainty
measure diff_pred. I conclude that, first, uncertainty is negatively correlated to a firms’
cyclical position relative to its trend, which is measured by the business situation. Second,
business expectations and the perceived uncertainty regarding these expectations are not
only conceptually related. They are also clearly dependent with a negative relationship
at the micro level.
The second finding recalls the stylized fact from the finance literature that conditional
volatility is negatively correlated with expected returns at stock markets (see, for instance,
Bekaert and Wu 2000 and Hibbert et al. 2008). However, it is unclear a priori whether
managers’ subjective uncertainty and expectations about their future business behave
similarly to financial market outcomes. The new survey evidence suggests that this it
indeed the case.
4.2 Uncertainty and Combinations of Situation and Expecta-
tions
Table 1 establishes negative bivariate relationships between uncertainty and business ex-
pectations as well as between uncertainty and the business situation. I now take this
analysis one step further by asking what degree of uncertainty respondents perceive for
combinations of their business situation and expectations. Overall, respondents’ expec-
tations and their assessment of the current business situation are positively related. The
correlation coefficient is 0.63 in the pooled sample. However, there are numerous cases
in which they differ.
Two cases are of particular interest: On the one hand, a firm can be in a good business
situation, but its expectations are unfavorable. Is the uncertainty of such a business high,
as the negative relationship between the uncertainty and expectations would suggest, or
is its uncertainty low, since the business is still in a good situation? On the other hand,
a business can be in a poor condition but have positive expectations. Does this go along
with high or low subjective uncertainty?
Figure 3 presents the relationship between uncertainty (unc) and combinations of ex-
pectations and the business situation. To facilitate the comprehension of this trivariate
relationship, I draw on the categorical responses to the trichotomous questions about
expectations and the state of business in ifo’s business cycle survey. The height of the
bars illustrates the mean values of uncertainty for the nine combinations of the business
situation assessed as good, satisfactory, or bad, and the expectations reported as favor-
able, unchanged, or unfavorable. Each combination is based on more than 880 firm-time
observations.
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Figure 3: Uncertainty by combinations of business situation and expectations
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Notes: The bar chart illustrates the mean values of uncertainty (unc) by the nine combinations of the
categorical responses to the trichotomous questions about the business situation and business expecta-
tions. Each mean is based on at least 889 firm-time observations.
The main result is that the respondents perceive high uncertainty if either their ex-
pectations are unfavorable or the assessment of their business situation is bad, or both.
If expectations are unfavorable, respondents perceive high uncertainty even in a good
business situation. If the situation is assessed as poor, uncertainty is high despite favor-
able expectations. Generally, the relationship between uncertainty and expectations is
state-dependent: it is weaker in bad times. Given the bivariate relationships in figure 2,
it does not come as a surprise that uncertainty is at its lowest if the business situation is
good and expectations are favorable.
Appendix C presents results of regressions of uncertainty (unc) on dummies for com-
binations of the categorical business situation and expectations (corresponding to figure
3). The case of a good situation and favorable expectations constitutes the baseline.
Replicating this estimation using fixed effects allows me to confirm that the main results
also hold for the within-firm time variation. Moreover, in Appendix C I demonstrate
that the stylized facts regarding the trivariate relationship between uncertainty, expecta-
tions, and the business situation are qualitatively the same for the uncertainty measure
diff_pred.
As an alternative to the three-dimensional bar chart in Figure 3, Appendix C presents
the trivariate relationship between uncertainty, expectations, and the business situation
also in a more continuous version, similar to figure 2. Instead of one non-parametric
regression line which illustrates the relationship between uncertainty and the business
situation, three lines represent the answer options of the trichotomous question about
business expectations. Again, it becomes clear that uncertainty is high if expectations
are unfavorable, irrespective of the business situation. If expectations are unchanged
or favorable, uncertainty is lower the better the situation. An analogous continuous
illustration of diff_pred instead of unc confirms this pattern.
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From an aggregate perspective of a stylized business cycle, these micro-level findings
tentatively suggest that subjective business uncertainty is elevated from the begin of a
downturn to the end of a recovery. In a good state, uncertainty starts to rise early
when expectations worsen. In a recession, better expectations do not immediately lower
perceived uncertainty. Rather, uncertainty prevails until the situation improves.
What may be reasons for this pattern? A starting point can be the asymmetry of
the business cycle (or firm cycle), which implies that the distribution of a firms’ growth
rates is typically negatively skewed.15 This implies that firms, in absolute terms, can
expect the average negative shock to be larger than the average positive shock. Suppose
a firm is in a good business situation and holds unfavorable expectations. Uncertainty
perceived as risk then concerns the magnitude of the negative shock. It can be large due
to the fat left tail of the demand shock distribution. This could explain why managers
are more uncertain if they expect the business situation to deteriorate than when they
expect an improvement. Orlik and Veldkamp (2014) provide a similar reasoning. They
show how tail risks arising from negatively skewed growth rates can explain an increase
of a forecasters’ macroeconomic uncertainty in recessions.
A complementary intuition for low uncertainty in a good business situation with favor-
able expectations can be based on strong signals of high demand in that case. Knowledge
about orders and being (temporarily) constrained by fix capacities can make it relatively
easy for managers to predict future sales and profits.16 Conversely, in case demand is
perceived as weak, decision makers lack knowledge about future sales and profits. Hence,
uncertainty is high in the case of unfavorable expectations or in a bad business situa-
tion. If an unfavorable business situation is a rather rare event for a firm, managers
may also be uncertain since they are unfamiliar with that situation. Uncertainty in a
bad situation may also originate from the question whether a realized negative shock is
temporary or permanent (Bernanke, 1983). In case of a temporary shock, expectations
eventually turn favorable. However, then again the potential magnitude of the expected
positive change is large. This can make forecasts quantitatively difficult. High upward
risk could explain the empirical finding of high perceived uncertainty in an unfavorable
situation with positive expectations. Noisy estimates of the recovery can have the same
effect (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2006). Moreover, in the presence of increased
risk aversion in a bad situation, there may be doubts about the reliability of positive
demand signals.17
4.3 Uncertainty and Components of Situation and Expectations
As discussed in Section 2.2, the variables of business expectations and business situation
are holistic concepts. For the purpose of robustness and traceability, in this section I
study whether factors that might feed into these measures correlate with uncertainty in
a similar way. Figure 4 relates uncertainty to six specific variables of business activity
from the ifo Business Survey that reflect the situation and expectations of firms.
15Evidence for asymmetry in aggregate and firm-level growth is presented, for instance, by Salgado
et al. (2020) and Ilut et al. (2018).
16In related research, Kuhn and George (2019) provide theoretical evidence that firms’ capacity con-
straints can prevent them from fully exploiting positive demand shocks. They use this rational to explain
the asymmetry of business cycles.
17Guiso et al. (2018) provide survey evidence that risk aversion was substantially elevated during the
period of low activity in 2009, after the shock of the Great Recession.
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The upper panel of figure 4 illustrates measures that are likely to be related to the
business situation: capacity utilization in %, the profit situation, and the assessment of
the stock of orders. The bottom panel presents expectations about production, prices,
and the number of employees of the firm over the next three months. ifo elicits the
capacity utilization in a respondent’s business at the time of the survey by providing
discrete answer options which range from 30% to 100%. The other five variables are
based on questions with categorical answer options.
Figure 4: Within-variation of uncertainty by variables of business activity
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Notes: The top left plot displays a non-parametric kernel regression line of degree zero with shaded
95% confidence bands for the relationship between the within-firm time variation in uncertainty (unc)
and the within-variation of capacity utilization. The unit at the x-axis is percentage points. I exclude
values below the 1%-percentile and above the 99%-percentile for better visibility. The figure further
presents bar charts illustrating coefficients from separate fixed effect regressions of uncertainty (unc) on
categorical variables from the ifo Business Survey, as denoted in the titles of the subplots. In particular,
the regressors are dummies based on two categorical answers (labels at the x-axes). Thus, each bar
corresponds to a coefficient relative to the middle category, which is “unchanged” in case of all variables
except the stock of orders and the profit situation. For the latter two variables, the middle categories
are labeled “sufficient” and “satisfactory”, respectively. The whiskers at the bars are 95% confidence
intervals. Capacity utilization is available once a quarter, the profit situation biannually, and all other
variables in monthly frequency.
For capacity utilization, I show a non-parametric regression line in the top left plot.
The bars in the other plots correspond to coefficients of fixed effect regressions on dummy
variables for the categories indicated on the x-axes, with the middle category serving
as the baseline. I focus on the within-firm time variation of uncertainty, but results
are similar for the total variation in the pooled sample (see appendix C). The within-
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variation is indicated at the y-axes of all plots. Technically, I take out firm fixed effects
before analyzing the relationships between uncertainty and the firm variables.
I find negative relationships between uncertainty and all six factors. Lower capacity
utilization in a firm, a worse profit situation, and a lower stock of orders are all connected
to higher uncertainty. A linear regression using fixed effects shows that, on average, a 10
percentage points lower capacity utilization goes along with 3.6 point higher uncertainty
on the visual analogue scale. A change in a firm’s assessment of its profit situation from
“good” to “bad” is associated with an increase of uncertainty of almost 15 points, on
average. The discrepancy between a situation with a “too low” and a “relatively high”
stock of orders is similar in magnitude. Respondents with less favorable expectations
about production, prices, and employment are also more uncertain.
To sum up, I establish robustness of the results in Section 4.1 by showing that the
negative relationships between uncertainty and expectations, and between uncertainty
and the business situation also hold for specific variables that are likely to feed into these
holistic measures.
5 Subjective Uncertainty in the Aggregate
In this section, I exploit the time series dimension of my sample, which extends over 31
months from July 2017 to January 2020. From an expansionary phase in the second half
of 2017, the German manufacturing sector fell into a recession that started in mid 2018
and lasted until the end of the sample period.18 Hence, the data allows me to study
aggregate fluctuations of subjective uncertainty.
Since the Great Recession, many time series of proxy measures of uncertainty have
been developed. For a recent overview, see Cascaldi-Garcia et al. (2020). With the new
ifo data, however, I am among the first to construct a time series that is based on micro
data on subjective uncertainty: it provides information on the uncertainty perceived by
actual decision makers in firms.19 The second key advantage of using survey data about
businesses is that I can construct a time series of expectations from the same respon-
dents. This allows me to compare micro-based time series of perceived uncertainty and
expectations. Moreover, I relate these series to respondents’ assessment of the business
situation. Given the micro evidence presented in Section 4, I ask whether subjective
business uncertainty is negatively related to expectations and the business situation also
in the aggregate.
Figure 5 presents time series for the manufacturing sector of subjective uncertainty
(unc) as well as of business expectations and the business situation. They are computed
as unweighted averages of the firm-level responses. Appendix D shows that weighting
these observations by firm size produces very similar time series and that the average
18To put this development in context, Appendix D displays a time series of seasonally and calendar
adjusted gross value added of the German manufacturing sector for a longer time series, namely since
1999. In the sample period, quarter-on-quarter growth rates dropped from a maximum of 1.7% in Q3
2017 to a minimum of -1.7% in Q2 2019. Annual growth was 3.8%, 1.3%, and -3.4% in 2017, 2018, and
2019, respectively.
19Glocker and Hölzl (2019) present a time series of uncertainty for the Austrian economy that is based
on micro data. Altig et al. (2020b) develop time series of firms’ uncertainty and expectations based on
firm-level data from the Survey of Business Uncertainty administered by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta. Leduc and Liu (2016) use a time series of the uncertainty of households about purchasing a
vehicle.
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business situation closely follows the two official series of industrial production and gross
value added in manufacturing.
Figure 5: Time series of subjective uncertainty, expectations, and the business situation
40
45
50
55
60
65
2017m7 2018m1 2018m7 2019m1 2019m7 2020m1
Uncertainty (unc)
Expectations
Situation
Notes: The figure presents time series of unweighted means of subjective uncertainty, business expec-
tations and an assessment of the respondents’ current business situation. These measures are based on
the firm-level answers to questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 2.2. The labels at the vertical axis are numbers
from a visual analogue scale that ranges from 0 to 100.
The first observation from Figure 5 is that firms’ subjective uncertainty is counter-
cyclical: uncertainty increases as the assessment of the business situation deteriorates
and the manufacturing sector slides into recession in mid-2018. In the short sample,
uncertainty and the business situation are highly negatively correlated, with a correlation
coefficient of -0.96. This confirms earlier findings based on proxy measures of uncertainty
and the time series of subjective business uncertainty for Austria presented by Glocker
and Hölzl (2019).
A second, and novel, observation is that the subjective uncertainty of businesses ap-
pears to be a mirror image of business expectations for most of the sample period: when
expectations decrease, uncertainty increases, and vice versa. In fact, uncertainty and
expectations are almost perfectly negatively correlated (-0.98). Revisiting the stylized
fact of countercyclicality, I note that uncertainty already increases in the first half of
2018, that is, before the business situation declines. This early increase in uncertainty
goes along with a deterioration in expectations. As a third observation, I note that if
the situation at the end of the sample period is unfavorable, expectations increase while
uncertainty remains essentially unchanged.
The second and third observations imply that the results from the micro level inves-
tigation in Section 4.2 also seem to hold for the time series: uncertainty is higher when
either expectations or the situation are more unfavorable, or both. While the economy is
still in a good state, along with deteriorating expectations, uncertainty already increases
in the first half of 2018. In the rather bad state at the end of the sample, uncertainty
remains at a high level despite an increase in expectations.
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Next, I divide the sample into three firm size classes and construct unweighted time
series for each of them.20 The results are displayed in Appendix D. I find that the
relationship between uncertainty and expectations as well as the business situation is
similar in the aggregate series. In general, the patterns of an increase in uncertainty and
deteriorating expectations and business situations between July 2017 and January 2020
are fairly consistent across all size classes.
To analyze whether the aggregate increase in uncertainty is subject to variation across
industries in the manufacturing sector, Appendix E presents an analysis of the time
variation for subsectors between 2017 and 2019. I find that uncertainty did not rise
evenly across industries. In line with the micro evidence and the time series result,
uncertainty increased more in industries that experienced a larger decline in expectations
and in the business situation.
Is the negative relationship between uncertainty and both expectations and the busi-
ness situation in the time series specific to the German manufacturing sector and the
sample period between July 2017 and January 2020? To broaden the scope of the anal-
ysis and to test the validity of the results, I proceed by studying subjective uncertainty
and expectations during the COVID-19 crisis.
6 Case Study: COVID-19 Crisis
The COVID-19 crisis constitutes an unprecedented disruption of economic activity world-
wide. Shutdowns imposed by governments triggered severe recessions that unfolded at
high speed. These characteristics of the COVID-19 crisis differ considerably from the
gradual and rather moderate economic downturn in the German manufacturing sector in
Germany in 2018 and 2019. Hence, the COVID-19 crisis provides fertile grounds for test-
ing the robustness of the time series results from the previous section. This constitutes
the first part of this case study. In the second part, I exploit cross-sectional differences in
changes in managers’ uncertainty and expectations at the beginning of crisis to investigate
their role for decisions about investment and employment.
6.1 Time Series during the COVID-19 Crisis
In this section, I test the robustness of the new stylized facts about the relationship
between subjective uncertainty and expectations by extending the sample until July 2020.
In this way, I include the COVID-19 crisis. To establish the stylized facts in the first
part of the paper, I have focused on data from the manufacturing sector in the time
period from July 2017 to January 2020. To analyze time variation in uncertainty, it is
most interesting to study. The reason is that, during this time, compared to the other
major sectors and the economy overall, the manufacturing sector exhibits the largest
fluctuations in economic activity.
With the longer sample that includes the COVID-19 crisis, I present time series for
subjective uncertainty (unc), expectations, and the business situation for the German
economy as a whole. As for all other time series in this section that are based on ifo data,
20Based on the number of employees, I define three size classes of firms. Following the definition of the
German Federal Statistical Office, small firms have less than 50 employees, medium-sized firms between
50 and 249 employees, and large firms 250 or more employees.
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I use the ifo weighting procedure described in Sauer and Wohlrabe (2020) to aggregate
firm-level data.21
To further test the validity of the stylized facts, I broaden the time series analysis
by considering additional measures of subjective business uncertainty. First, I present a
monthly time series of diff_pred that starts in April 2019.22 Second, since my previous
results could be exclusive to the measures of subjective uncertainty unc and diff_pred, I
present a quarterly time series of a third measure of subjective uncertainty. It is calculated
as the difference between the quantitative quarter-on-quarter sales growth expectations
in the best and the worst case in percentage points. The underlying data stems from a
survey supplement to the ifo business cycle survey, which is conducted in the first month
of a quarter. It also contains a question on expected sales growth in the most likely case.
See Bachmann et al. (2018) for a detailed description. This time series is based on ifo
survey data from firms in manufacturing, retail and wholesale trade, and services. For
all of these sectors, it is available starting in April 2019.
Third, I compare the time series for Germany with time series on subjective uncer-
tainty and expectations for the United States. In particular, I draw on the monthly
quantitative survey results on firms’ uncertainty and expectations about twelve-month-
ahead sales growth from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. The survey elicits five
sales growth scenarios from best to worst in percentage points and asks the respondents
to assign probabilities to these scenarios. Uncertainty is computed as the standard devia-
tion and the expectation as the mean of the resulting five-point distribution. The survey
design is documented in detail by Altig et al. (2020b).23
Conceptually, I note that the four measures of uncertainty and expectations differ
in several ways: unc and diff_pred are based on qualitative data and refer to the busi-
ness development over the next six months, while the other measures are quantitative
and refer to quarter-on-quarter and twelve-month-ahead sales growth. The four time
series of subjective uncertainty and business expectations are displayed in Figure 6. The
uncertainty measure diff_pred is depicted jointly with the balance statistics from the cat-
egorical questions on business expectations and the business situation in the top left plot.
In the plots in the top row for unc and unc_pred, I also include the business situation.
Despite the differences in the construction of the series, the evidence from the four
plots is very similar. I make two observations. First, during the COVID-19 crisis the
developments of perceived uncertainty and expectations are almost perfectly inversely re-
lated. From March 2020 onward, the sharp decline in expectations, followed by a recovery,
is mirrored by a sharp increase in uncertainty and a subsequent decrease. Appendix F
shows that this pattern is also present for the time series of all major sectors of the Ger-
man economy. Based on admittedly rather short time series, these findings support the
stylized fact of the negative relationship between uncertainty and expectations from the
micro data and the time series of the manufacturing sector.
21Firm-level responses are first aggregated to the 2-digit level of the WZ08 classification using firm
size weights, and then aggregated to the level of the total economy by using value added weights from
the German Federal Statistical Office.
22To compute a balance statistic for diff_pred, I assign the values -1, -0.5, 0.5, and 1 for the answer
options "easy", "rather easy", "rather difficult", and "difficult", respectively.
23The time series for subjective business uncertainty and expectations of US firms goes back to January
2015 and are available online at https://www.frbatlanta.org/research/surveys/business-uncertainty.
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Figure 6: Subjective uncertainty and expectations in the COVID-19 crisis and before
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Notes: The plot in the top left presents size-weighted time series of subjective uncertainty (unc),
expectations, and the business situation elicited using visual analogue scales. The uncertainty (diff_pred)
series in the top right plot is a size-weighted balance statistics constructed from the responses to question 4
described in Section 2.2. The other series in the top right plot are balance statistics from ifo’s categorical
questions on expectations and the business situation described in the same section. The plot in the
bottom left shows size-weighted time series of quantitative expectations and uncertainty about q-o-q sales
growth. Uncertainty is computed as the difference between best and worst case expectations as described
in Bachmann et al. (2018). The data stems from a survey supplement to the ifo business cycle survey
and is elicited from firms in manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and services. It is available for all
of these sectors since Q2 2019. The plot in the bottom right shows business uncertainty and expectations
with respect to twelve-month-ahead sales growth from the Atlanta Fed/Chicago Booth/Stanford Survey
of Business Uncertainty. For comparability, the x-axis ranges from July 2017 to July 2020 for all plots.
Second, after the COVID-19 spike in April 2020, for all measures the increase in ex-
pectations is larger than the decrease in subjective uncertainty. For instance, the top
left plot in Figure 6 shows that from April to July 2020 business expectations recover
80% of the initial drop from February to April, whereas unc only recovers 36%. This
difference in the recovery rate is even more pronounced for the series in the other two
plots for Germany. While only based on few data points, this second observation sup-
ports the previous microdata-based result—and the findings from the time series of the
manufacturing sector before the COVID-19 recession—that the relationship between un-
certainty and expectations is weaker in bad times. For Germany, low economic activity
in mid-2020 is indicated by an unfavorable business situation in the aggregate. At this
time, uncertainty remains elevated even though expectations improve.
To sum up, the stylized facts from the micro data and the time series of the manufac-
turing sector are also manifest during the COVID-19 crisis. They are robust to different
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measures of perceived uncertainty, they hold for different sectors of the German economy,
and they apply both for Germany and the US.
An implication of this finding is that, when using time series econometric analyses,
it may be difficult to disentangle possible effects of subjective business uncertainty on
macroeconomic variables, such as investment and GDP, from the effects of expectations.
As an alternative approach, in the next section I use micro data to empirically study the
predictions of a theoretical channel that links uncertainty to firm behavior.
6.2 Uncertainty, Expectations, and Corporate Decisions
When examining the effect of uncertainty on firms’ economic decisions, one prominent
theoretical channel is centered around “real options” (Bernanke, 1983; Brennan and
Schwartz, 1985; McDonald and Siegel, 1986).24 When decisions in firms cannot be eas-
ily reversed (or it is costly to do so) and when they affect the profitability of actions
taken later, managers confronted with high uncertainty may prefer to “wait and see”.
More specifically, in such a case, it can be optimal for a business to postpone investment
projects and to stop hiring and firing until the outlook becomes clearer. Due to the lack
of suitable measures of subjective uncertainty at the firm level, empirical evidence on
such behavior is scarce.
Perceived uncertainty seems to fluctuate most around recessions. Section 6.1 has
provided evidence that the onset of the COVID-19 crisis was accompanied by a massive
increase in uncertainty, while expectations plummeted. Based on the theoretical con-
siderations above, in the presence of an uncertainty shock alone I would expect firms to
postpone investments and to leave the number of employees largely unchanged.25 A nega-
tive first moment shock is also likely to make firms defer investments. However, we would
expect them to reduce employment as a consequence. The actual effect of each of the
two shocks is unclear. Therefore, it is interesting to use micro data to study the relation-
ship between uncertainty and firms’ actions while the aggregate economy simultaneously
experiences a first and a second moment shock.
In this case study, I exploit the cross-sectional heterogeneity in changes of subjective
uncertainty and expectations between German firms in the onset of the COVID-19 crisis.
I use the aggregate variation to find out whether differences in the impact of this shock
on the subjective uncertainty of managers relates to differences in their investment and
employment decisions.
Sample
24Other possible theoretical channels include precautionary behavior, borrowing constraints due to
higher risk premia, and a loss in confidence caused by ambiguity aversion. Growth options and the Oi-
Hartman-Abel effect constitute theoretical mechanisms that can explain positive investment and growth
effects from uncertainty. Bloom (2014) provides an overview of these channels.
25According to the “real options” channel, uncertainty can lead managers to postpone investments if
they are at least partially irreversible. Indeed, Guiso and Parigi (1999) find stronger negative effects
of uncertainty on investment the more difficult or costly firms assess the possibility to resell investment
goods after they were acquired. Surveying Swiss firms, Dibiasi et al. (2018) present evidence that 70% of
the respondents consider their investments to be highly or fully irreversible; 94% view them as at least
somewhat irreversible. The degree of irreversibility seems idiosyncratic to firms as the authors cannot
predict it by observable characteristics such as size and sector. Given that almost all firms in the Swiss
sample report at least some degree of irreversibility of their investments, I find it reasonable to assume
that the “real options” theory would predict that also firms in my sample “wait and see” if they are
confronted with high uncertainty.
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To address this question, I use the micro data that underlie the top left plot in fig-
ure 6 in the previous section. The relevant sample comprises the February, March, and
April waves of the ifo Business Survey from 2020 and contains responses from firms in
the manufacturing industry, construction, retail and wholesale trade, and the service
sector.26 Based on this data, I relate subjective uncertainty (unc) and business expec-
tations in March to subsequent self-reported information in April about whether firms
have postponed investment projects and whether they have reduced employment, respec-
tively, because of the COVID-19 crisis. Appendix F contains a translation of the special
question in the April wave of the ifo Business Survey which asks firms about measures
taken in response to the pandemic.
While the March wave of the ifo Business Survey was conducted from March 2 to
March 24, I base my analysis on the subsample of firms that submitted their question-
naires in the nine days from March 16 to March 24.27 Appendix F shows that this group
of respondents is representative for the entire sample of firms that responded in March.
Selecting this subsample ensures that managers are well-informed about the gravity of
the crisis, and especially about the shutdown. As a result, I can exploit the full aggregate
variation of the shock to uncertainty and expectations. Using data from the beginning
of March would blur the within-variation of the aggregate shock as idiosyncratic changes
in uncertainty and expectations are likely to dominate changes in beliefs due to the
COVID-19 crisis.
Descriptive Evidence
To further motivate why I focus on the firms that responded between March 16 and 24, I
present a series of descriptive evidence. Table F.1 in Appendix F presents a short time-line
of events during the onset of the COVID-19 crisis in Germany. Due to the unprecedented
character of the crisis, the negative consequences of the pandemic for the economy only
became apparent gradually: on March 10, many federal states canceled mass events with
more than 1,000 participants. On March 13, schools and childcare facilities were closed in
most federal states. On March 16, the first day of the subsample period for the analysis,
Germany closed its federal borders and the government announced the closing of shops
and public facilities.
Along these events, subjective uncertainty (unc) increases and business expectations
deteriorate.28 Figure 7 divides the respondents of the March wave of the ifo survey
into three groups and displays the change of their subjective uncertainty, expectations,
and assessment of their business situation against the corresponding values from their
responses in February. The first group of respondents who submit their survey responses
before March 9, record an increase in uncertainty of 5.9 compared to February. For the
second group, with a submission date between March 10 and March 15, it is 9.6 points.
The third group, that responds between March 16 and 24, shows the largest increase: on
average, these firms report an increase in their perceived uncertainty of 19.2 points on
the visual analogue scale. The aggregate increase between February and April 2020 is
likewise about 20 points on the visual analogue scale. Hence, by using the responses from
the third group of firms, I can exploit the full variation of the aggregate shock. Figure
26I follow the data cleaning and harmonization procedure described in Link (2020).
27Appendix F presents a histogram of the submission dates in March. Information on this date is
missing for 12% of all participants. I exclude these observations from all further analyses. Of the
participants for which a submission date is available, 21% responded between March 16 and 24.
28Buchheim et al. (2020b) have first documented this shift in firms’ expectations and uncertainty.
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7 further indicates that the decrease in expectations is of a similar magnitude as the
increase in uncertainty. The assessments of the current business situation also worsen,
but the decline is less than the change in expectations.29
Figure 7: Changes of uncertainty, expectations, and the business situation in March 2020
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Notes: The figure presents changes in subjective uncertainty (unc), business expectations and the
business situation between three periods in March 2020 (indicated on the horizontal axis) against the
averages of the responses from the same groups of firms in February, respectively. These measures are
based on the firm-level answers to questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 2.2. The labels at the vertical axis
are numbers from a visual analogue scales that ranges from 0 to 100.
In the analysis, I use the variation between firms with respect to changes in their per-
ceived uncertainty and expectations between February and March. The aim is to capture
the variation that is due to the aggregate shock of the COVID-19 crisis, as opposed to
idiosyncratic changes. Figure 8 presents distributions of changes between February and
March in subjective uncertainty (unc) and expectations, respectively, for the three groups
of firms identified above. The changes for all firms in January and February compared
to the previous month, respectively, are also displayed as a reference. They are centered
around zero. Thus, these changes are not driven by a common aggregate shock but reflect
idiosyncratic variation at a lower level.
While the kernel density estimate for the first group of firms that responded between
March 2 and 8 shows only minor deviations from the distributions of the changes in
January and February, the kernel density estimates for the second group of firms (March
9-15) differ more. For the third group (March 16-24), the distribution is much wider and
clearly positively skewed in case of the changes in uncertainty and negatively skewed for
changes in expectations. This reflects the aggregate shock to uncertainty and expectations
triggered by the events at the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis. Considering only the
third group of firms, that responds between March 16 and 24, should allow me to mostly
capture this variation. Moreover, I observe ample heterogeneity between firms: while on
average, respondents become more uncertain and pessimistic, these changes in beliefs are
more pronounced among some managers compared to others.
Econometric Model and Estimation
29The month-over-month changes in the three variables for the three weeks of the survey in March
2019 are tiny; they are all smaller than one point on the visual analogue scale in absolute terms. This
suggests that there are no shifts in firms’ perceptions that regularly occur during the month of March.
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Figure 8: Distribution of changes in uncertainty and expectations
0
.02
.04
.06
de
ns
ity
-100 -50 0 50 100
month-over-month change in uncertainty (unc)
January
February
March 2-8
March 9-15
March 16-24
Uncertainty
0
.02
.04
.06
de
ns
ity
-100 -50 0 50 100
month-over-month change in expectations
January
February
March 2-8
March 9-15
March 16-24
Expectations
Notes: The figure shows kernel density estimates for month-over-month changes in subjective uncer-
tainty (unc) in the left plot and month-over-month changes of expectations in the right plot for all firms
in January and February, respectively, as well as for three groups of firms in March, split by the date of
submission of their questionnaire. The density estimates are obtained using an epanechnikov kernel and
the “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth (Silverman, 1986). The measures for uncertainty and expectations are
based on the responses to questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 2.2. The horizontal axes depict changes based
on numbers from visual analogue scales that range from 0 to 100.
I exploit this between-firm variation to estimate the relationship between uncertainty
(unc) and corporate decisions. As the baseline econometric specification, I choose a
probit model of the form:
yit = β0 + β1∆ui,t−1 + β2ui,t−2 + β3∆ei,t−1 + β4ei,t−2 + β5∆si,t−1 + β6si,t−2 + γ
′xi + ǫit
where yit denotes a dummy variable for firm i’s decision at time t, which can be either to
postpone investments or to reduce employment. ∆ui,t−1, ∆ei,t−1, and ∆si,t−1 are changes
in uncertainty, expectations, and the business situation between periods t − 2 and t − 1.
ui,t−2, ei,t−2, and si,t−2 are the levels of these variables in period t − 2, respectively. xi
captures time-invariant firm characteristics, namely size and sector, and ǫit is an error
term.
For the estimation, I use survey data from February, March, and April 2020, which
refer to t − 2, t − 1, and t above. Unconditionally, 43% of the firms that responded
between March 16 and 24 report in April that they have postponed investments and 16%
state that they have reduced employment because of the COVID-19 crisis.30 For the
baseline regressions, I use the uncertainty measure unc, as well as business expectations
and situation elicited with a visual analogue scale. These variables are based on questions
1, 2, and 3 in Section 2.2. To control for the size of the firms, I define dummy variables
for three size classes based on the number of employees: small firms have less than 50
employees, medium-sized firms have between 50 and 249 employees, and large firms have
250 or more employees. This categorization is in line with the official definition of the
German Federal Statistical Office. To take out sector-specific effects, I include dummies
for sectors at the two-digit level of the German WZ08 classification, which is closely
related to the European industry classification system NACE Rev. 2.
The econometric model contains both levels in period t − 2 as well as changes in
uncertainty, expectations, and the business situation between t− 2 and t− 1. The levels
30The responses of the April survey were collected between April 1 and April 23.
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in February control for heterogeneity between firms before the aggregate shock. This
is especially advantageous in view of the boundedness of the visual analogue scale. It
allows me to compare changes between firms with the same level in February. As I want
to relate changes of uncertainty caused by the aggregate shock of the COVID-19 crisis to
managers’ investment and employment decisions, my primary focus is on the coefficient
of the change in uncertainty, β1.
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Results
Table F.5 presents average marginal effects from ten probit regressions. The dependent
variable in columns 1 to 5 is a dummy for firms’ decisions to postpone investment, in
columns 6 to 10 the dependent variable is a dummy for the decision to reduce employment.
From the regressions in columns 1 to 5, I find that there is a weak positive relation-
ship between changes in uncertainty and the probability that firms postpone investments,
when controlling for the base level of uncertainty. However, the coefficients are not sig-
nificant at the 5%-level and they seem to be dominated by other variables. The level
of uncertainty before the aggregate shock of the COVID-19 crisis appears to be a much
better predictor of firms’ decisions to postpone investments. Column 2 shows that, un-
conditionally, both the base level and the change in expectations are strongly negatively
related to the dependent variable. The coefficients are quantitatively important: a de-
crease in expectations by ten points on the visual analogue scale goes along with an
increase of the likelihood to postpone investments by roughly five percentage points. In
the joint regression of levels and changes in uncertainty and expectations in column 3,
the level of expectations becomes insignificant. When adding variables for the level and
change of the business situation in column 4, only the change in the situation is signifi-
cant. These results are robust to including firm size and sector dummies in column 5. To
sum up, changes in expectations and the business situation triggered by the COVID-19
crisis are related to a higher likelihood to postpone investments, while changes in uncer-
tainty are not. Moreover, firms with a higher level of uncertainty before the aggregate
shock more often defer investments because of the crisis.
Columns 6 to 10 show that changes in uncertainty are not related to the decision
to lay off employees. In case of a “freeze” of employment, I would have expected a
significant negative coefficient. With higher uncertainty, firms would be less likely to
lay off personnel. However, the coefficients in all specifications are quantitatively small
and statistically not significant. In contrast, column 7 illustrates that the relationship
between changes in expectations and the decision to reduce employment is strong. The
more pronounced the deterioration in expectations, the more likely respondents downsize
their workforce. The levels of uncertainty and expectations in February in columns 6 and
7 are also connected to a higher probability to lay off employees. In the joint regression
in column 8, the level and change in expectations drive out the level of uncertainty.
31Given the negative relationships of uncertainty and expectations as well as uncertainty and the
business situation documented in Section 4.1, there might be a concern of multicollinearity. Table F.3
in Appendix F shows that the main regressors in levels and changes are indeed correlated. However,
none of the pairwise correlation coefficients exceeds 0.53. The R-squared from an OLS regression of
∆ui,t−1 on the level of uncertainty in t − 2, as well as level and change variables of expectations and the
business situation is 0.33. This leaves room for independent contributions of the regressors. Table F.3
also shows that individual firms seem to experience the aggregate uncertainty and expectation shocks
quite differently: the correlation between changes in uncertainty and changes in expectations is merely
-0.21.
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Including levels and changes in the business situation in column 9, as well as size and
sector dummies in column 10, emphasizes the role of pre-existing differences between
firms for their decisions to lay off staff. Moreover, changes in the business situation seem
most important as a transmission channel from the aggregate shock to the decision to
reduce employment.
These results suggest that the first moment shock at the onset of the COVID-19
crisis dominates the effects that we expect from a pure uncertainty shock. I do not
find evidence that firms postpone investment or “freeze” employment following changes
in uncertainty. In contrast, negative changes of expectations and of the assessment of
the business situation are significantly related to these corporate decisions. Moreover,
perceptions and the business situation before the aggregate shock also predict firms’
reactions to the crisis. This is in line with previous findings by Buchheim et al. (2020a).
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Table 2: Relationship between corporate investment and employment decisions and past uncertainty, expectations, and situation
Dependent variable: decision: postponement of investment decision: reduction of the number of employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆Uncertainty in t − 1 0.00150∗ 0.000543 0.000631 0.000583 0.0000985 -0.000411 -0.000279 0.000278
(1.84) (0.67) (0.77) (0.71) (0.15) (-0.67) (-0.46) (0.45)
Uncertainty in t − 2 0.00552∗∗∗ 0.00459∗∗∗ 0.00456∗∗∗ 0.00406∗∗∗ 0.00208∗∗∗ 0.000654 0.000679 0.00100
(5.82) (4.54) (4.27) (3.73) (2.60) (0.85) (0.87) (1.16)
∆Expectations in t − 1 -0.00534∗∗∗ -0.00466∗∗∗ -0.00312∗∗∗ -0.00330∗∗∗ -0.00325∗∗∗ -0.00311∗∗∗ -0.00147∗ -0.00109
(-5.93) (-4.89) (-2.96) (-3.15) (-3.88) (-3.66) (-1.77) (-1.39)
Expectations in t − 2 -0.00433∗∗∗ -0.00216 -0.000945 -0.000599 -0.00568∗∗∗ -0.00524∗∗∗ -0.00374∗∗∗ -0.00402∗∗∗
(-3.44) (-1.60) (-0.64) (-0.40) (-5.33) (-4.74) (-3.20) (-3.23)
∆Situation in t − 1 -0.00330∗∗∗ -0.00331∗∗∗ -0.00315∗∗∗ -0.00286∗∗∗
(-3.31) (-3.14) (-4.09) (-3.75)
Situation in t − 2 -0.00210∗ -0.00166 -0.00214∗∗ -0.00163∗
(-1.76) (-1.29) (-2.47) (-1.69)
Dummy medium sized firms 0.0309 0.0305
(0.71) (0.86)
Dummy large firms 0.0279 0.0284
(0.48) (0.64)
Sector dummies YES YES
No. of firms 660 667 656 653 630 660 667 656 653 561
Pseudo R-sq. 0.037 0.039 0.066 0.078 0.15 0.019 0.077 0.080 0.11 0.24
Notes: Average marginal effects from probit regressions. The dependent variable in columns 1 to 5 is a dummy for the decision to postpone investment
projects because of the COVID-19 crisis, in columns 6 to 10 it is a dummy for the decision to reduce employment because of the COVID-19 crisis.
Information on these corporate decisions stems from the ifo Business Survey in April 2020. The regressors are levels of uncertainty (unc), expectations,
and business situation from February 2020, and month-over-month changes from March 2020. These measures are based on the responses to questions
1, 2, and 3 in Section 2.2. t-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
28
Appendix F presents additional regressions for two related managerial decisions: the
cancellation of investment projects and the implementation of short-time work. I use
dummies for these actions as dependent variables in otherwise unchanged regressions.
The data stems from the same special question in April as the data on the decisions
to postpone investments and to reduce employment. Unconditionally, 19% of the firms
that responded between March 16 and 24 report to have canceled investment projects,
and 49% indicate to have introduced short-time work. In principal, uncertainty could
also affect these decisions via precautionary behavior. However, this does not seem to
be the case: once expectations are controlled for, again I find that only first moment
changes—and pre-existing business conditions before the aggregate shock—are related to
these investment and employment decisions.
Robustness
Did managers anticipate the economic consequences of the COVID-19 crisis before March
2020? News about the COVID-19 epidemic in Asia could have affected uncertainty and
expectations of respondents in February. However, Buchheim et al. (2020b) show that
there was basically no such effect. Instead, respondents of the ifo Business Survey only
changed their beliefs once domestic policy imposed measures to contain the epidemic in
March. The spread of the disease in Italy only became known on February 21, the last
day of this month’s survey wave. Hence, information about the outbreak in Europe is
also unlikely to affect the results.
Appendix F presents several robustness checks for the baseline regression results
above. First, instead of computing marginal effects from probit regressions, I estimate
linear probability models. The results are almost exactly the same. Second, I estimate the
baseline regressions excluding firms from the manufacturing sector. Due to the relatively
poor performance of this sector relative to the other major sectors before the COVID-19
crisis, it may drive some of the results. However, this is not the case: the main regressions
results are robust to excluding manufacturing firms from the sample.
Third, to account for possible measurement error in the variables for uncertainty,
expectations, and the business situation, I apply the Obviously Related Instrumental
Variable (ORIV) approach proposed by Gillen et al. (2019). To this end, in the sample
from February to April 2020, I first regress the uncertainty variable unc on diff_pred
and use the predicted values, as well as changes of the predicted values, as alternative
regressors ∆ui,t−1∗ and ui,t−2∗. These new variables capture the common variation in
unc and diff_pred and are free of independent and identically distributed measurement
error. By regressing expectations and the business situation measured using visual ana-
logue scales on their categorical counter-parts, I analogously obtain predicted values for
these variables, in levels and in changes. Table F.7 in Appendix F shows that the main
results are robust to re-estimating the baseline regressions with these modified variables.
A difference is that the coefficients of expectations and the business situation are sub-
stantially larger using the ORIV approach. This suggests the presence of an attenuation
bias in the baseline regressions. As a consequence, in the regressions with the modified
variables, uncertainty in February is driven out by expectations and the situation. In
contrast to the baseline regressions, using the ORIV approach the level of uncertainty
before the aggregate shock does not predict firms’ investment and employment decisions
anymore.
As another robustness test, Table F.8 replicates the baseline regressions in Table F.5
using the uncertainty measure diff_pred as well as the categorical variables for expecta-
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tions and the business situation. This requires the definition of several dummy variables.
Regarding diff_pred, I join the sparsely populated category “Easy” with the category
“Rather easy” and create indicator variables for the resulting three levels of the difficulty
to predict the future business development in periods t − 2 and t − 1. Based on these
uncertainty states, I define dummy variables for positive and negative changes from t− 2
to t − 1. Moreover, I use the trichotomous variables on expectations and the business
situation to create dummies for the levels in t− 2 as well as positive and negative changes
between t − 2 and t − 1, respectively. In the regressions, I define the lowest uncertainty
level as well as the middle categories of expectations and the business situation as the
baseline. The baseline for the variables in changes are the cases of no change, respectively.
The regression results in Table F.8 confirm the main findings from above. Unfavorable
expectations in the level as well as negative changes in expectations drive out the effect
captured by the dummy for increases in uncertainty. This holds true for both the decision
to postpone investments and the decision to reduce the number of employees. In regres-
sions with only uncertainty and expectation variables, the level of uncertainty in February
is also significantly related to the outcome dummies. However, it turns insignificant once
I control for levels and changes of the business situation.
7 Conclusion
The uncertainty of firms and households is inherently subjective. As for expectations, a
good way to measure it is to ask actual decision makers about their perceptions. Based on
data from a large and representative German business survey, this paper presents a novel
direct measure of firms’ subjective uncertainty about the development of their businesses.
It appears to be a sensible measure since it contains essentially the same information as
a second measure of perceived uncertainty that asks managers to assess the difficulty to
predict their future business development. The collection of more data of this kind can
facilitate research concerned with the effect of subjective uncertainty on decision making
and the business cycle.
While conceptually closely related, there is little empirical evidence on the relationship
between subjective uncertainty and expectations. I contrast managers’ perceived uncer-
tainty with their business expectations and an assessment of their business situation and
find strong negative relations at the micro level and almost perfectly inverse relationships
in the time series. Moreover, the relationship between uncertainty and expectations is
state-dependent: in bad times, this relationship is weaker, since uncertainty is generally
high. The new evidence highlights the simultaneity of movements in subjective uncer-
tainty and both expectations and business activity in the aggregate. This impedes the
identification of aggregate uncertainty shocks using time-series econometric methods. As
an alternative approach, the availability of micro data of managers’ perceptions allows
me to analyze the impact of uncertainty on firm behavior.
Exploiting the between-firm variation at the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, I investigate
the relation of uncertainty and expectations to firms’ decisions to postpone investment
projects and to reduce the number of employees. I find that changes in uncertainty
during the aggregate downturn do not predict “wait and see” behavior. By contrast, first
moment changes are related to the deferral of investment and a reduction of the workforce.
These results may be particular to the sharp economic downturn in March 2020, which
was extraordinary in many respects. More research should be devoted to examine the
30
link between perceived uncertainty and corporate actions. Of particular interest could be
the business cycle stage of an early recovery, when expectations improve but uncertainty
remains elevated.
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Appendix
Appendix A Data
Figure A.1: Online questionnaire with questions using visual analogue scales
Notes: In the original German, the screenshot shows the section of the online survey questionnaire that
elicits an assessment of the business situation as well as expectations and subjective uncertainty about
the future business development using visual analogue scales. They correspond to questions 1, 2, and 3
in Section 2.2.
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Table A.1: Representativeness of online participants in the ifo Business Survey
(1)
Dep. variable: dummy for online participation probit
Dummy medium sized firms 0.0177
(0.0455)
Dummy large firms 0.250∗∗∗
(0.0591)
capacity utilization in % 0.0107∗∗∗
(0.00171)
Dummy production vs previous month: more 0.00133
(0.0409)
Dummy production vs previous month: less 0.0996∗∗
(0.0431)
Dummy production vs previous month: no production -0.101
(0.239)
Dummy order vs previous month: higher 0.0405
(0.0428)
Dummy order vs previous month: lower 0.0266
(0.0418)
Dummy demand vs previous month: higher 0.113∗∗∗
(0.0431)
Dummy demand vs previous month: lower 0.0287
(0.0406)
Dummy domestic prices vs previous month: increase -0.0107
(0.0418)
Dummy domestic prices vs previous month: decrease -0.158∗
(0.0804)
Dummy capacity utilization, appraisal: more than enough -0.0580
(0.0582)
Dummy capacity utilization, appraisal: not enough 0.0564
(0.0481)
Dummy state of business: good -0.0330
(0.0454)
Dummy state of business: bad 0.0680
(0.0598)
Dummy expected commercial operations: favourable 0.0404
(0.0435)
Dummy expected commercial operations: unfavourable -0.00589
(0.0428)
Dummy orders, appraisal: relatively high -0.0433
(0.0529)
Dummy orders, appraisal: too small 0.0924∗
(0.0550)
Dummy foreign orders, appraisal: relatively high -0.0271
(0.0643)
Dummy foreign orders, appraisal: too small -0.0382
(0.0611)
Dummy foreign orders, appraisal: no fexport -0.372∗∗∗
(0.0689)
Dummy expected domestic prices: increase 0.000872
(0.0387)
Dummy expected domestic prices: decrease 0.0599
(0.0691)
Dummy expected number of employees: increase 0.0171
(0.0520)
Dummy expected number of employees: decrease 0.0184
(0.0528)
Dummy stock of inventories: too little 0.0141
(0.0705)
Dummy stock of inventories: too much 0.0272
(0.0578)
Dummy stock of inventories: no stock-keeping 0.103∗
(0.0584)
Dummy constraints to production: yes 0.196∗∗∗
(0.0423)
Constant -0.444∗∗∗
(0.154)
No. of observations 17432
No. of firms 3182
Pseudo R-squared 0.035
Notes: Probit regression of a dummy variable that
identifies online participants—vs. mainly paper-based
respondents—in the manufacturing part of the ifo
Business Survey on firm characteristics and variables
of business activity. The underlying sample spans from
July 2017 to January 2020. Standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered by firm; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
37
Appendix B Comparing Two Measures of Subjective
Uncertainty
Figure B.1: Determinants of business situation and expectations from meta survey
Notes: The bar chart presents the results of two questions in a meta survey about the ifo Business
Survey conducted in fall 2019. Respondents were asked to rate the importance of a list of variables for
their assessment of the business situation and business expectations using numbers from 0 (unimportant)
to 6 (very important).
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Table B.1: Relationship of the business situation and variables of business activity
Dependent variable: business situation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Dummy production vs previous month: more 11.13∗∗∗
(23.00)
Dummy production vs previous month: less -18.44∗∗∗
(-38.73)
Dummy orders vs previous month: higher 9.808∗∗∗
(22.50)
Dummy orders vs previous month: lower -14.89∗∗∗
(-34.39)
Dummy demand vs previous month: higher 7.155∗∗∗
(16.27)
Dummy demand vs previous month: lower -14.76∗∗∗
(-33.05)
Dummy domestic prices vs previous month: increase 7.367∗∗∗
(12.33)
Dummy domestic prices vs previous month: decrease -16.43∗∗∗
(-16.36)
capacity utilization in % 0.715∗∗∗
(29.89)
Dummy stock of orders: relatively high 16.83∗∗∗
(33.03)
Dummy stock of orders: too small -22.36∗∗∗
(-44.99)
Dummy profit situation: good 19.56∗∗∗
(33.77)
Dummy profit situation: bad -19.48∗∗∗
(-31.01)
Dummy constraints to production: yes -7.509∗∗∗
(-12.64)
Dummy expected production: increase 8.280∗∗∗
(15.19)
Dummy expected production: decrease -16.73∗∗∗
(-31.46)
Dummy expected number of employees: increase 15.80∗∗∗
(25.95)
Dummy expected number of employees: decrease -19.63∗∗∗
(-31.22)
Dummy expected domestic prices: increase 5.618∗∗∗
(10.16)
Dummy expected domestic prices: decrease -15.43∗∗∗
(-17.04)
Constant 57.16∗∗∗ 57.19∗∗∗ 57.48∗∗∗ 55.90∗∗∗ -3.934∗ 57.79∗∗∗ 54.24∗∗∗ 60.14∗∗∗ 56.73∗∗∗ 56.18∗∗∗ 55.92∗∗∗
(158.70) (154.63) (148.05) (149.99) (-1.91) (187.26) (159.97) (146.06) (154.77) (158.23) (148.54)
No. of observations 46006 45938 46056 45941 14492 45597 7222 16060 46127 46026 45852
R-squared 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.045 0.25 0.43 0.45 0.032 0.13 0.19 0.044
Notes: Results from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the respondents’ assessment of the business situation, based on question 1 in
Section 2.2. The base category of the dummy variables constructed from the responses of the questions on changes in production, orders, demand,
and prices, and of the expectations questions is “unchanged”. The base level for the dummies for the stock of orders and profit situation is labeled
“satisfactory”, respectively. t-statistics in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered by firm; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.2: Relationship of business expectations and variables of business activity
Dependent variable: business expectations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Dummy production vs previous month: more 8.363∗∗∗
(20.17)
Dummy production vs previous month: less -9.860∗∗∗
(-22.29)
Dummy orders vs previous month: higher 7.653∗∗∗
(21.29)
Dummy orders vs previous month: lower -10.63∗∗∗
(-29.02)
Dummy demand vs previous month: higher 7.541∗∗∗
(20.88)
Dummy demand vs previous month: lower -11.00∗∗∗
(-29.67)
Dummy domestic prices vs previous month: increase 5.005∗∗∗
(11.28)
Dummy domestic prices vs previous month: decrease -11.31∗∗∗
(-12.47)
capacity utilization in % 0.254∗∗∗
(13.44)
Dummy stock of orders: relatively high 6.068∗∗∗
(12.95)
Dummy stock of orders: too small -11.29∗∗∗
(-24.93)
Dummy profit situation: good 6.832∗∗∗
(12.39)
Dummy profit situation: bad -8.582∗∗∗
(-13.94)
Dummy constraints to production: yes -4.411∗∗∗
(-10.22)
Dummy expected production: increase 11.62∗∗∗
(27.39)
Dummy expected production: decrease -15.81∗∗∗
(-35.93)
Dummy expected number of employees: increase 11.47∗∗∗
(21.06)
Dummy expected number of employees: decrease -13.29∗∗∗
(-23.26)
Dummy expected domestic prices: increase 4.808∗∗∗
(10.97)
Dummy expected domestic prices: decrease -13.35∗∗∗
(-17.49)
Constant 51.31∗∗∗ 51.81∗∗∗ 51.71∗∗∗ 51.07∗∗∗ 30.15∗∗∗ 52.60∗∗∗ 50.63∗∗∗ 53.61∗∗∗ 50.96∗∗∗ 51.15∗∗∗ 51.05∗∗∗
(209.07) (208.25) (209.68) (189.94) (18.38) (202.73) (155.89) (168.91) (228.92) (210.63) (193.40)
No. of observations 45989 45923 46039 45927 14488 45575 7219 16053 46111 46011 45841
R-squared 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.033 0.052 0.14 0.11 0.018 0.24 0.14 0.052
Notes: Results from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is business expectations, based on question 2 in Section 2.2. The base category of
the dummy variables constructed from the responses of the questions on changes in production, orders, demand, and prices, and of the expectations
questions is “unchanged”. The base level for the dummies for the stock of orders and profit situation is labeled “satisfactory”, respectively. t-statistics
in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered by firm; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.3: Summary statistics of situation, expectations, and uncertainty (unc)
Variable No. Obs Mean Std. Dev. P1 P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P99
Business situation 46413 56.1 20.7 6 30 45 53 71 85 99
Business expectations 46394 51.2 16.5 8 30 45 50 59 73 95
Uncertainty: unc 46740 55.2 19.9 5 28 47 53 69 81 97
Notes: Summary statistics of the responses from questions 1, 2, and 3 in section 2.2 for the manufac-
turing sector. The sample ranges from July 2017 to January 2020.
Table B.4: Summary statistics of uncertainty: diff_pred
No. Obs. Share
Easy 277 0.02
Rather easy 3,282 0.20
Rather difficult 10,053 0.62
Difficult 2,499 0.16
Total 16,111 1.00
Notes: Distribution of the responses to
question 4 in section 2.2 for the manu-
facturing sector. The sample ranges from
April 2019 to January 2020.
Figure B.2: Comparison of two measures of subjective uncertainty
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Notes: The box plot illustrates the distribution of the responses of the direct uncertainty question 3 in
Section 2.2 (unc) for each of the answer options of the indirect uncertainty question 4 (diff_pred).
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Appendix C Subjective Uncertainty at the Micro Level
Figure C.1: Relation of uncertainty (diff_pred) to expectations and the business situation
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Notes: This figure shows non-parametric kernel regression lines of degree zero with shaded 95% confi-
dence bands as well as fitted linear regression lines for the relationship between uncertainty (diff_pred)
and business expectations in the left plot, and between uncertainty (diff_pred) and the business situation
in the right plot. The assessment of the business situation, expectations, and uncertainty are based on
questions 1, 2, and 4 in section 2.2, respectively. The categorical values of diff_pred “Easy”, “Rather
Easy”, “Rather difficult”, and “Difficult” are coded as -1.5, -0.5, 0.5, and 1.5, respectively.
Figure C.2: Relation of uncertainty to the business situation by expectation category
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Notes: The figure shows two plots with non-parametric kernel regression lines of degree zero with
shaded 95% confidence bands for the relationship between uncertainty and the business situation, for
three subsamples according to the respondents’ business expectations being unfavorable, unchanged,
and favorable. The vertical axis of the left plot depicts the uncertainty measure unc that is based on
question 3 in Section 2.2; for the right plot it is diff_pred that is based on question 4 in Section 2.2.
The assessment of the business situation is based on question 1 in Section 2.2. The categorical values of
diff_pred “Easy”, “Rather Easy”, “Rather difficult”, and “Difficult” are coded as -1.5, -0.5, 0.5, and 1.5,
respectively.
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Figure C.3: Uncertainty (diff_pred) for combinations of business situation and expecta-
tions
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Notes: The bar chart illustrates the mean values of uncertainty (diff_pred) by the nine combinations
of the categorical responses to the trichotomous questions about the business situation and business
expectations described in Section 2.2. Each mean is based on at least 527 firm-time observations. For
this illustration, the categories of diff_pred “Easy”, “Rather Easy”, “Rather difficult”, and “Difficult”
are coded as 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The underlying sample from the spans from April 2019 to
January 2020.
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Table C.1: Uncertainty by interaction dummies of business situation and expectations
(1) (2)
POLS FE
Situation good and expectations unchanged 6.677∗∗∗ 4.629∗∗∗
(0.774) (0.409)
Situation good and expectations unfavorable 22.35∗∗∗ 14.49∗∗∗
(1.054) (0.677)
Situation satisfactory and expectations favorable 10.01∗∗∗ 8.992∗∗∗
(0.899) (0.544)
Situation satisfactory and expectations unchanged 13.21∗∗∗ 11.70∗∗∗
(0.834) (0.506)
Situation satisfactory and expectations unfavorable 22.43∗∗∗ 16.89∗∗∗
(0.953) (0.601)
Situation bad and expectations favorable 19.93∗∗∗ 17.63∗∗∗
(1.274) (0.821)
Situation bad and expectations unchanged 20.57∗∗∗ 19.09∗∗∗
(1.325) (0.740)
Situation bad and expectations unfavorable 26.31∗∗∗ 21.21∗∗∗
(1.223) (0.834)
Constant 42.73∗∗∗ 45.06∗∗∗
(0.800) (0.405)
No. of obs. 46248 46248
R-squared 0.14 0.55
Notes: Results from OLS and fixed effects regressions. The dependent variable is uncer-
tainty (unc). The regressors are are based on the categorical questions on expectations
and the business situation described in Section 2.2. In both regressions, the baseline
category is a dummy for a good situation and favorable expectations. Standard errors
in parentheses, clustered by firm; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure C.4: Total variation of uncertainty by variables of business activity
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Notes: The top left plot displays a non-parametric kernel regression line of degree zero with shaded 95%
confidence bands for the relationship between uncertainty (unc) and capacity utilization in percent. I
restrict the x-axis to the inter-decile range of capacity utilization for better visibility. The figure further
presents bar charts illustrating coefficients from separate pooled OLS regressions of uncertainty (unc) on
categorical variables from the ifo Business Survey, as denoted in the titles of the subplots. In particular,
the regressors are dummies based on two categorical answers (labels at the x-axes). Thus, each bar
corresponds to a coefficient relative to the middle category, which is “unchanged” in case of all variables
except the stock of orders and the profit situation. For the latter two variables, the middle categories
are labeled “sufficient” and “satisfactory”, respectively. The whiskers at the bars are 95% confidence
intervals. Capacity utilization is available once a quarter, the profit situation biannually, and all other
variables in monthly frequency.
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Appendix D Subjective Uncertainty in the Aggre-
gate
Figure D.1: Weighted and unweighted time series
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Notes: The figure presents weighted and unweighted aggregate time series of subjective uncertainty,
business expectations and an assessment of the respondents’ current business situation. These measures
are based on the firm-level answers to questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 2.2. The labels at the vertical axis
are numbers from a visual analogue scale that ranges from 0 to 100. The weighted series are computed
following the standard aggregation approach at ifo described in Sauer and Wohlrabe (2020). Weighting
occurs in a two-step procedure: in the first step, observations are aggregated to the 2-digit WZ 08 sector
level using firm size weights. In the second step, gross value added weights based on data from the
German Statistical Office are used to aggregate from the 2-digit sector level to total manufacturing. The
unweighted series are based on simple averages.
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Figure D.2: Business situation vs. industrial production and gross value added
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Notes: The left plot shows the unweighted average of the assessment of the business situation by
manufacturing firms described in Section 2.2 and a monthly index of seasonally and calendar adjusted
industrial production in the manufacturing sector from Eurostat. The right plot depicts the unweighted
average of the business situation from manufacturing firms with a quarterly series of seasonally and
calendar adjusted gross value added in constant prices for the manufacturing sector, provided by the
German Federal Statistical Office.
Figure D.3: Long time series of gross value added in manufacturing
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Notes: The figure depicts a quarterly index of seasonally and calender adjusted gross value added in
manufacturing from Q1 1999 to Q4 2019. The sample period from Q3 2017 to Q4 2019 is marked in
yellow. Note that the sample also includes January 2020. However, due to the impact of the COVID-19
crisis in March 2020, I leave out the value of the gross value added series for Q1 2020.
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Figure D.4: Time series of uncertainty, expectations, and situation by firm size
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Notes: The figure presents time series of unweighted means of subjective uncertainty, business expecta-
tions and an assessment of the respondents’ current business situation. These measures are based on the
firm-level answers to questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 2.2. I categorize firms in three size classes based on
the number of employees, following the definition of the German Federal Statistical Office: small firms
have less than 50 employees, medium-sized firms between 50 and 249 employees, and large firms 250 or
more employees.
48
Appendix E Variation in Uncertainty and Sectoral
Performance
Industries in the manufacturing sector are typically affected differently by an economic
downturn. More cyclical sectors such as vehicle production or machinery tend to contract
more than industries with rather stable demand, such as the food or pharmaceutical
industries. The aim of this appendix is to better understand the drivers of the aggregate
increase in perceived uncertainty. Does uncertainty increase fairly evenly in all sectors,
or are different sectoral paths in the economic downturn related to sectoral heterogeneity
in uncertainty?
Figure E.1: Changes in uncertainty, expectations, and the situation by sector
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Notes: The left plot of the figure presents a scatter plot and a non-parametric kernel regression line of
degree zero with an epanechnikov kernel and the “rule of thumb” bandwidth for the relationship between
the change in average uncertainty (unc) and the change in average business expectations between 2017
and 2019 at the 2-digit WZ08 sector level. In particular, for each sector, I take averages of uncertainty and
expectations over two periods, respectively: July through December in 2017 and July through December
in 2019, before computing the time-differences between these averages. The right plot replicates the left
plot, but replaces business expectations with the assessment of the business situation. For both plots, I
exclude sectors 12, 15, 19, 30, and 33, for which I have less than 10 observations in at least one month
of the two time periods. The assessments of the business situation, expectations, and uncertainty are
based on questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 2.2. Responses are elicited using visual analogue scales that
range from 0 to 100, respectively.
To answer this question, I compare uncertainty (unc), expectations, and the business
situation for a time period of low aggregate uncertainty in the beginning of the sample
with a time period of high aggregate uncertainty in the end of the sample. For each 2-digit
sector from the WZ08 classification, I compute averages of the three variables for the six
months from July to December 2017, and from July to December 2019, respectively.32
Taking differences of these averages allows me to compare changes in uncertainty to
changes in expectations and changes in the business situation at the industry level. These
comparisons are illustrated in Figure E.1.
As expected, the two scatter plots show a sectoral heterogeneity in the change in ex-
pectations and the change in the assessment of the business situation between the second
half of 2017 and the second half of 2019. This is the variation along the horizontal axes of
the two plots, respectively. For instance, cyclical sectors, such as the industries produc-
ing motor vehicles and electrical equipment, underwent a large decline of their business
32The German WZ08 classification, short for “Klassifikation der Wirtschaftszweige 2008” is closely
related to the European industry classification system NACE Rev. 2.
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situation by approximately 14 and 20 points on the visual analogue scale, respectively.
The food and pharmaceutical sectors, on the other hand, reported a decline of only one
and six points, respectively.
As the main result of this exercise, I find that uncertainty increased more in industries
that experienced a larger decline in expectations and in the business situation. The neg-
ative correlations are high: the coefficient between changes in uncertainty and changes in
expectations is -0.83; for changes in uncertainty vs. changes in the business situation the
coefficient is -0.87. Thus, uncertainty did not rise evenly across all industries. Hetero-
geneity in sectoral performance is reflected in heterogeneity in uncertainty. This implies
that the aggregate increase in uncertainty in the sample period was driven by industries
whose situation and expectations deteriorated the most.
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Appendix F Case Study: COVID-19 Crisis
Figure F.1: Uncertainty (unc), expectations, and business situation by major sector
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Notes: The figure presents size-weighted time series of subjective uncertainty (unc), expectations, and
the business situation for five major sectors of the German economy. The survey responses are elicited
using visual analogue scales as described in Section 2.2.
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Figure F.2: Uncertainty (diff_pred), expectations, and business situation by major sector
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Notes: The figure shows size-weighted time series of uncertainty (diff_pred) for five major sectors of the
German economy. They are constructed as balance statistics using the responses to question 4 described
in Section 2.2. The weights are -1 for the answer option "easy", -0.5 for "rather easy", 0.5 for "rather
difficult", and 1 for "difficult". The other series are balance statistics from ifo’s categorical questions on
expectations and the business situation.
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Figure F.3: Sales growth uncertainty, expectations, and business situation by major sector
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Note: The figure shows size-weighted time series of quantitative expectations and uncertainty about
quarter-over-quarter sales growth for four major sectors of the German economy. Uncertainty is computed
as the difference between expectations in the best and in the worst case, as described in Bachmann et al.
(2018). Its unit for uncertainty at the vertical axis is percentage points. The data stems from a survey
supplement to the ifo Business Survey. It is available for all four major sectors since Q2 2019.
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Below is the author’s English translation of a special question in the ifo Business Survey
from April 2020. For the baseline analysis in section 6.2, I use the responses on whether
or not businesses reduced employment and whether or not they postponed investment
projects. Additional regressions use the responses on short-time work and the cancella-
tion of investment projects.
Which measures has your firm taken in response to the Corona pandemic?
Operations:
2 Intensified use of working from home
2 Short-time work
2 Reduction of time accounts and leave days
2 Reduction of employment (e.g., lay-offs, desist from extensions)
2 Plant closure, stop of production
2 Increased stock-keeping
2 Change of suppliers / diversification of supply chains
Finances / Investment:
2 Use of existing credit lines
2 Acquisition of new credit lines
2 Application for public liquidity facilities
2 Postponement of investment projects
2 Cancellation of investment projects
Table F.1: Selected events in the onset of the COVID-19 crisis in Germany
Date Event
March 2 The German Robert Koch Institute raises the threat level for the population
to “moderate” because of COVID-19.
March 6 The German Health Minister rules out “any measure leading to restrictions
on travel” within the European Union.
March 8 Recommendation of the German Health Minister to cancel events with more than
1000 participants.
March 9 Second death because of COVID-19 in Germany; more than 1,200 verified infections.
March 12 Federal and State governments recommend to avoid gatherings and social contacts.
March 13 Schools and childcare facilities close in almost all federal states.
March 16 German federal borders are closed; start of shutdown
in which most shops and many public facilities are being closed.
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Figure F.4: Histogram of the submission dates of the responses in March 2020
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Note: Histogram of the submission dates of the questionnaires of the ifo Business Survey in March 2020.
It was conducted from March 2 to March 24.
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Table F.2: Representativeness of subsample of firms responding from March 16 to 24
March 2 to 15 March 16 to 24
Mean N Mean N
Firm characteristics
Dummy small firms 0.557 4,767 0.546 1,269
Dummy medium firms 0.297 4,767 0.284 1,269
Dummy large firms 0.143 4,767 0.164 1,269
Dummy manufacturing 0.319 4,767 0.251 1,269
Dummy construction 0.093 4,767 0.128 1,269
Dummy wholesale & retail trade 0.245 4,767 0.199 1,269
Dummy services 0.342 4,767 0.422 1,269
Responses in February 2020
Situation (visual analogue scale) 53.5 3,367 54.7 809
Expectations (visual analogue scale) 51.2 3,370 52.0 806
Uncertainty (unc) (visual analogue scale) 55.4 3,367 54.5 804
Dummy situation bad 0.157 4,251 0.136 920
Dummy situation good 0.335 4,251 0.370 920
Dummy expectation unfavorable 0.213 4,251 0.192 920
Dummy expectation favorable 0.178 4,251 0.184 920
Dummy uncertainty (diff_pred): easy or rather easy to predict 0.343 4,224 0.357 908
Dummy uncertainty (diff_pred): rather difficult to predict 0.532 4,224 0.537 908
Dummy uncertainty (diff_pred): difficult to predict 0.125 4,224 0.106 908
Responses in April 2020
Dummy investment postponed 0.405 4,248 0.426 1,004
Dummy employment reduced 0.151 4,248 0.161 1,004
Dummy investment canceled 0.196 4,248 0.187 1,004
Dummy short-time work 0.471 4,248 0.488 1,004
Notes: The table presents means and the number of observations for a list of variables for two subsam-
ples: firms the responded between March 2 and March 15, and firms that responded between March 16
and March 24. The top panel of the table presents the shares and frequencies of the responses from three
size classes and four major economic sectors, respectively. The second panel considers past responses
of the firms from February 2020 about the business situation, expectations, and uncertainty. The last
panel shows the firms’ subsequent responses in April 2020 about investment and employment decisions.
Table F.3: Correlation of regressors, levels and changes
∆Unc. in t − 1 Unc. in t − 2 ∆Exp. in t − 1 Exp. in t − 2 ∆Sit. in t − 1 Sit. in t − 2
∆Unc. in t − 1 1.00
Unc. in t − 2 -0.53 1.00
∆Exp. in t − 1 -0.21 0.05 1.00
Exp. in t − 2 0.18 -0.32 -0.46 1.00
∆Sit. in t − 1 -0.23 0.19 0.47 -0.24 1.00
Sit. in t − 2 0.31 -0.49 -0.20 0.53 -0.36 1.00
Notes: Pairwise correlations of main regressors in Table F.5: uncertainty (unc), expectations,
and business situation as levels in February (t − 2) and as month-over-month changes in March
2020 (t − 1). These variables are based on the responses to questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 2.2
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Table F.4: Relationship between other corporate investment and employment decisions and past uncertainty, expectations, and situation
Dependent variable: decision: cancellation of investment projects decision: short-time work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆Uncertainty in t − 1 0.000500 -0.000694 -0.000678 -0.000323 0.000403 -0.0000603 -0.000119 0.000232
(0.62) (-0.86) (-0.81) (-0.37) (0.60) (-0.10) (-0.20) (0.35)
Uncertainty in t − 2 0.00314∗∗∗ 0.00113 -0.0000990 0.000368 0.00303∗∗∗ 0.00142∗ 0.00102 0.00121
(3.14) (1.08) (-0.09) (0.35) (3.90) (1.96) (1.33) (1.36)
∆Expectations in t − 1 -0.00559∗∗∗ -0.00571∗∗∗ -0.00251∗∗ -0.00207∗∗ -0.00312∗∗∗ -0.00288∗∗∗ -0.00189∗∗ -0.00194∗∗
(-6.31) (-6.09) (-2.57) (-2.14) (-4.14) (-3.65) (-2.31) (-2.36)
Expectations in t − 2 -0.00686∗∗∗ -0.00616∗∗∗ -0.00139 -0.000962 -0.00630∗∗∗ -0.00557∗∗∗ -0.00384∗∗∗ -0.00481∗∗∗
(-5.54) (-4.68) (-0.97) (-0.68) (-6.37) (-5.46) (-3.39) (-4.11)
∆Situation in t − 1 -0.00705∗∗∗ -0.00659∗∗∗ -0.00221∗∗∗ -0.00318∗∗∗
(-8.13) (-6.88) (-2.87) (-3.55)
Situation in t − 2 -0.00820∗∗∗ -0.00618∗∗∗ -0.00259∗∗∗ -0.00244∗∗
(-7.53) (-5.19) (-2.82) (-2.31)
Dummy medium sized firms 0.0919∗∗ 0.00321
(2.14) (0.09)
Dummy large firms 0.116∗∗ 0.0670
(2.08) (1.41)
Sector dummies YES YES
No. of firms 660 667 656 653 602 660 667 656 653 586
Pseudo R-sq. 0.012 0.052 0.057 0.14 0.22 0.029 0.072 0.080 0.099 0.17
Notes: Average marginal effects from probit regressions. The dependent variable in columns 1 to 5 is a dummy for the decision to cancel investment projects
because of the COVID-19 crisis, in columns 6 to 10 it is a dummy for the decision to implement short-time work because of the COVID-19 crisis. Information
on firms’ decisions stems from the ifo Business Survey in April 2020. The regressors are levels of uncertainty (unc), expectations, and business situation
from February 2020, and month-over-month changes from March 2020. These measures are based on the responses to questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 2.2.
t-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.5: Robustness linear probability model: relationship corporate decisions and past uncertainty, expectations, and situation
Dependent variable: decision: postponement of investment decision: reduction of the number of employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆Uncertainty in t − 1 0.00148∗ 0.000567 0.000682 0.000660 0.000156 -0.000399 -0.000237 0.000215
(1.86) (0.70) (0.83) (0.75) (0.23) (-0.59) (-0.36) (0.36)
Uncertainty in t − 2 0.00551∗∗∗ 0.00457∗∗∗ 0.00452∗∗∗ 0.00394∗∗∗ 0.00210∗∗∗ 0.000564 0.000474 0.000719
(5.85) (4.61) (4.28) (3.41) (2.60) (0.68) (0.56) (0.90)
∆Expectations in t − 1 -0.00528∗∗∗ -0.00464∗∗∗ -0.00312∗∗∗ -0.00317∗∗∗ -0.00297∗∗∗ -0.00289∗∗∗ -0.00133∗ -0.000779
(-6.06) (-5.01) (-3.00) (-2.91) (-4.55) (-4.17) (-1.80) (-1.05)
Expectations in t − 2 -0.00437∗∗∗ -0.00234∗ -0.00127 -0.00105 -0.00572∗∗∗ -0.00535∗∗∗ -0.00408∗∗∗ -0.00402∗∗∗
(-3.46) (-1.77) (-0.89) (-0.70) (-5.57) (-4.83) (-3.68) (-3.58)
∆Situation in t − 1 -0.00327∗∗∗ -0.00324∗∗∗ -0.00324∗∗∗ -0.00271∗∗∗
(-3.19) (-2.84) (-3.93) (-3.27)
Situation in t − 2 -0.00194∗ -0.00141 -0.00222∗∗∗ -0.00156∗
(-1.70) (-1.08) (-2.89) (-1.93)
Dummy medium sized firms 0.0339 0.0302
(0.74) (0.85)
Dummy large firms 0.0289 0.0222
(0.47) (0.51)
Constant 0.0788 0.526∗∗∗ 0.169∗ 0.210∗ -0.195 0.0337 0.385∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.195∗
(1.25) (8.58) (1.75) (1.87) (-1.37) (0.63) (7.21) (4.04) (4.10) (1.87)
Sector dummies YES YES
No. of firms 660 667 656 653 653 660 667 656 653 653
R-sq. 0.048 0.052 0.085 0.100 0.21 0.016 0.064 0.066 0.094 0.24
Notes: Results from OLS regressions. The dependent variable in columns 1 to 5 is a dummy for the decision to postpone investment projects because of the
COVID-19 crisis, in columns 6 to 10 it is a dummy for the decision to reduce employment because of the COVID-19 crisis. Information on firms’ decisions
stems from the ifo Business Survey in April 2020. The regressors are levels of uncertainty (unc), expectations, and business situation from February 2020,
and month-over-month changes from March 2020. These measures are based on the responses to questions 1, 2, and 3 in Section 2.2. Standard errors in
parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.6: Robustness manufacturing excluded: relationship corporate decisions and past uncertainty, expectations, and situation
Dependent variable: decision: postponement of investment decision: reduction of the number of employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆Uncertainty in t − 1 0.00213∗∗ 0.000985 0.00115 0.00142 0.000637 -0.000101 0.000104 0.000730
(2.31) (1.10) (1.26) (1.53) (0.82) (-0.15) (0.16) (1.09)
Uncertainty in t − 2 0.00493∗∗∗ 0.00428∗∗∗ 0.00407∗∗∗ 0.00457∗∗∗ 0.00288∗∗∗ 0.00154∗ 0.00151∗ 0.00220∗∗
(4.37) (3.51) (3.25) (3.58) (3.12) (1.71) (1.71) (2.29)
∆Expectations in t − 1 -0.00576∗∗∗ -0.00525∗∗∗ -0.00345∗∗∗ -0.00304∗∗ -0.00384∗∗∗ -0.00364∗∗∗ -0.00137 -0.000935
(-5.70) (-4.96) (-2.89) (-2.49) (-3.96) (-3.74) (-1.51) (-1.15)
Expectations in t − 2 -0.00300∗∗ -0.00116 0.000363 0.00101 -0.00508∗∗∗ -0.00420∗∗∗ -0.00199 -0.00229
(-2.05) (-0.74) (0.21) (0.57) (-3.81) (-3.08) (-1.44) (-1.62)
∆Situation in t − 1 -0.00336∗∗∗ -0.00295∗∗ -0.00376∗∗∗ -0.00291∗∗∗
(-3.18) (-2.56) (-4.82) (-3.92)
Situation in t − 2 -0.00268∗ -0.00197 -0.00297∗∗∗ -0.00189∗
(-1.93) (-1.31) (-2.80) (-1.78)
Dummy medium sized firms 0.00302 0.0127
(0.06) (0.34)
Dummy large firms 0.0506 0.0165
(0.71) (0.31)
Sector dummies YES YES
No. of firms. 487 492 484 481 464 487 492 484 481 424
Pseudo R-sq. 0.028 0.049 0.071 0.088 0.15 0.032 0.082 0.091 0.16 0.27
Notes: Average marginal effects from probit regressions that exclude firms from the manufacturing sector. The dependent variable in columns 1 to 5 is
a dummy for the decision to postpone investment projects because of the COVID-19 crisis, in columns 6 to 10 it is a dummy for the decision to reduce
employment because of the COVID-19 crisis. Information on firms’ decisions stems from the ifo Business Survey in April 2020. The regressors are levels of
uncertainty (unc), expectations, and business situation from February 2020, and month-over-month changes from March 2020. These measures are based on
the responses to questions 1, 2, and 3 in section 2.2. t-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.7: Robustness measurement error: relationship corporate decisions and past uncertainty, expectations, and situation
Dependent variable: decision: postponement of investment decision: reduction of the number of employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆Uncertainty* in t − 1 0.000358 -0.00137 -0.00182 -0.00202 0.00121 0.000334 -0.0000395 -0.000562
(0.18) (-0.65) (-0.87) (-0.98) (0.74) (0.21) (-0.03) (-0.39)
Uncertainty* in t − 2 0.00469∗∗∗ 0.00316∗ 0.000726 -0.000465 0.00336∗∗∗ 0.00133 -0.000279 -0.00150
(2.95) (1.84) (0.39) (-0.25) (2.62) (0.99) (-0.20) (-1.03)
∆Expectations* in t − 1 -0.0108∗∗∗ -0.0106∗∗∗ -0.00872∗∗∗ -0.00857∗∗∗ -0.00928∗∗∗ -0.00875∗∗∗ -0.00575∗∗ -0.00522∗
(-4.53) (-4.38) (-3.52) (-3.48) (-3.31) (-3.13) (-2.20) (-1.86)
Expectations* in t − 2 -0.00906∗∗∗ -0.00751∗∗∗ -0.00512∗∗ -0.00511∗∗ -0.00948∗∗∗ -0.00867∗∗∗ -0.00607∗∗∗ -0.00622∗∗∗
(-4.53) (-3.57) (-2.38) (-2.42) (-4.42) (-3.99) (-3.07) (-2.92)
∆Situation* in t − 1 -0.00609∗∗∗ -0.00666∗∗∗ -0.00607∗∗∗ -0.00691∗∗∗
(-3.71) (-3.84) (-4.86) (-5.11)
Situation* in t − 2 -0.00526∗∗∗ -0.00488∗∗∗ -0.00419∗∗∗ -0.00460∗∗∗
(-4.14) (-3.44) (-4.50) (-3.87)
Dummy medium sized firms 0.0249 0.0335
(0.55) (0.95)
Dummy large firms 0.0202 -0.0107
(0.33) (-0.23)
Sector dummies YES YES
No. of firms 654 650 639 629 606 654 650 639 629 542
Pseudo R-sq. 0.013 0.029 0.038 0.062 0.13 0.017 0.064 0.064 0.12 0.25
Notes: Average marginal effects from probit regressions. The dependent variable in columns 1 to 5 is a dummy for the decision to postpone investment
projects, in columns 6 to 10 it is a dummy for the decision to reduce employment. Information on firms’ decisions stems from the ifo Business Survey in
April 2020. The right hand side variables marked with a star contain predicted values from regressions of the levels of uncertainty (unc), expectations, and
business situation elicited using visual analogue scales in February 2020 on their categorical counter-parts, respectively. The other regressors marked with a
star are predicted values from regressions of monthly changes in the visual analogue scale variables on changes in the categorical variables in March 2020. In
case of uncertainty (unc), the predicted values stem from regressions on diff_pred. This implements the Obviously Related Instrumental Variable approach
to account for independent and identically distributed measurement error. The regressors are based on the responses to questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 as well the
categorical questions on business expectations and the situation presented in Section 2.2. t-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table F.8: Robustness uncertainty diff_pred: Relationship corporate decisions and past uncertainty, expectations, and situation
Dependent variable: decision: postponement of investment decision: reduction of the number of employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Uncertainty: negative change in t − 1 0.101 0.0741 0.0857 0.0881 0.0294 0.0153 0.00843 0.0298
(1.30) (0.96) (1.11) (1.18) (0.54) (0.28) (0.16) (0.54)
Uncertainty: positive change in t − 1 0.0974∗∗ 0.0381 0.0254 0.0193 0.0664∗∗ 0.0334 0.0180 -0.00291
(2.51) (0.92) (0.61) (0.45) (2.26) (1.08) (0.60) (-0.09)
Uncertainty: dummy ’rather difficult’ in t − 2 0.0958∗∗ 0.0620 -0.00130 -0.0344 0.0485∗ 0.0105 -0.0246 -0.0353
(2.55) (1.56) (-0.03) (-0.77) (1.73) (0.35) (-0.78) (-1.03)
Uncertainty: dummy ’difficult’ in t − 2 0.267∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗ 0.0727 0.0251 0.192∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.0551 -0.000124
(4.04) (2.30) (0.96) (0.33) (4.20) (2.02) (1.09) (-0.00)
Expectations: negative change in t − 1 0.221∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.0959∗∗
(5.18) (4.26) (3.63) (3.24) (4.17) (3.70) (2.75) (1.98)
Expectations: positive change in t − 1 -0.111 -0.106 -0.0853 -0.0649 -0.0670 -0.0625 -0.0323 -0.0383
(-1.07) (-1.02) (-0.85) (-0.65) (-0.82) (-0.79) (-0.43) (-0.55)
Expectations: dummy ’favorable’ in t − 2 0.00652 0.0217 0.0245 0.0279 -0.0218 -0.0185 -0.0151 -0.00840
(0.16) (0.51) (0.57) (0.64) (-0.71) (-0.58) (-0.48) (-0.24)
Expectations: dummy ’unfavorable’ in t − 2 0.314∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
(5.75) (4.49) (2.95) (3.24) (5.71) (4.87) (3.70) (3.22)
Situation: negative change in t − 1 0.117∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(2.98) (3.38) (4.70) (4.53)
Situation: positive change in t − 1 -0.0389 -0.0628 -0.0594 -0.0836
(-0.60) (-0.99) (-1.23) (-1.63)
Situation: dummy ’good’ in t − 2 -0.137∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.0696∗∗ -0.0544
(-3.31) (-3.29) (-2.30) (-1.57)
Situation: dummy ’bad’ in t − 2 0.104∗ 0.0865 0.112∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(1.81) (1.47) (3.05) (3.12)
Dummy medium sized firms 0.0437 0.0483
(1.07) (1.56)
Dummy large firms 0.0558 0.0276
(1.01) (0.67)
Sector dummies YES YES
No. of firms 796 782 782 775 750 796 782 782 775 670
Pseudo R-sq. 0.019 0.036 0.043 0.060 0.11 0.029 0.065 0.073 0.12 0.24
Notes: Average marginal effects from probit regressions. The dependent variable in columns 1 to 5 is a dummy for the decision to postpone investment
projects because of the COVID-19 crisis, in columns 6 to 10 it is a dummy for the decision to reduce employment because of the COVID-19 crisis.
Information on firms’ decisions stems from the ifo Business Survey in April 2020. The regressors are levels of uncertainty (diff_pred), expectations, and
business situation from February 2020, and month-over-month changes from March 2020. These measures are based on the responses to question 4 and
the categorical questions on business expectations and the situation presented in Section 2.2. t-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01.
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